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Abstract
I study firms’ debt maturity decisions. I provide two models for optimal debt maturity
choices when facing stochastic productivity and rollover risk. The first model is based
on firms’ need to smooth their capital when facing uncertainties in external financing.
When the capital market freezes, new external financing is difficult. Firms with large
debt repayments due have to forego good investment opportunities and in severe
cases cut back on dividends. Long-term debt reduces immediate repayments and
allows firms to keep the borrowed capital for future production. Therefore, when
freezes are likely, firms respond by using more long-term financing and are better
prepared. However, when the probability of freezes is low, firms turn to short-term
financing. When a freeze suddenly occurs, the impact is significant and costly. The
model predicts that constrained firms use more short-term debt. Based on the model,
I propose investment-debt sensitivity as a new measure for financial constraints.
The second model depicts an economy in which entrepreneurs reallocate capital
resources through borrowing and lending in either short-term or long-term debt. In
expansions, productivity is more persistent and uncertainty in productivity is low,
so entrepreneurs can better predict their future prospects. Hence, they choose to
use more long-term debt to finance their productions. In recessions, future prospects
are less clear to the entrepreneurs; therefore, they choose to use more short-term
debt. The model explains the documented facts on pro-cyclical debt maturity in
the economy. It also highlights that the shortening debt maturity structure causes
capital resources to be less efficiently allocated in recessions further exacerbates the
iv
bad times. I argue that the change in the predictability of TFP drives pro-cyclical
debt maturity, and that the maturity structure further amplifies the fluctuations in
aggregate production.
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1Rollover Risk and Debt Maturity
1.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the last recession, the government, the media, and the academia
all blamed short-term financing for causing and exacerbating the crisis. However, it
is important to understand why firms choose to take on so much short-term debt in
the first place. In this chapter, I provide a dynamic model of firm financing with
collateralized short and long-term debt in an environment with potential market
freezes. Firms may choose to borrow short-term debt which requires a lower interest
rate than long-term debt. However, they will be more exposed to rollover risk when
the debt repayment is due and the market for external financing freezes. Hence,
firms’ debt maturity decisions depend on the likelihood of a market freeze. The
model points out that when the probability of a financial market freeze is viewed
to be low, firms optimally switch to short-term financing. As a consequence they
become more vulnerable to adverse shocks to external financing. Consequently, when
the capital market suddenly freezes, the effects are devastating.
Prior literature on capital structure linked firms’ new investment and financing
decisions to their existing financial characteristics. However, when a firm tries to raise
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capital through external financing, the (shadow) cost of borrowing usually depends
on both the firm’s characteristics and financial market conditions. For example, when
the firm has a weak balance sheet or dim future profitability, its cost of borrowing
will be high. Equally important, if the overall financing condition is severe, like
when the capital market collapses, the cost of borrowing will be high. Therefore,
the firm has to manage the accumulation of net worth while taking into account the
possible disruptions of financing shocks. In recent years, many papers have focused
on explaining how financial crises occur. In particular some focus on how short-
term debt structure leads to market freezes (see, for example, Acharya, Gales, and
Yorulmazer (2011)). In this chapter, I do not try to model how market freezes come
about, but rather treat it as an exogenous shock to the firm. This allows me to focus
on the firm’s response to the risk of not being able to borrow when a freeze occurs.
The main contribution of my model is to recognize that debt maturity structures
play an important role in balancing firm growth and hedging for rollover risk caused
by an adverse shock to external capital markets. Essentially, a long debt maturity
structure reduces the repayments due for each period. In the extreme case, with
perpetual long-term debt, firms never have to repay the principal of the debt, thus
they can keep the capital in production for all periods. On the other hand, short-
term debt demands a low interest rate but needs to be refinanced more often. Hence,
short-term debt facilitates the accumulation of net worth in the current period while
exposing the firm to higher future rollover risk when future financing is costly. This
trade off has important implications.
The model predicts that more constrained firms choose to use more short-term
debt in order to facilitate current investment and grow net worth faster. Using a quasi-
natural experiment from decreases in tariffs, I confirm that when firms become more
constrained due to exogenous increases to competition, they use more short-term debt.
On average, firms that experience abnormal increases in competition reduce their
2
fraction of long-term (maturing in more than 3 year) debt by 7.9%. Or equivalently,
the firms reduce their average debt maturity from 7.5 years to 7 years after the increase
in competition.1 Moreover, I propose a new measure for financial constraints based
on the fact that debt repayment should have a large impact on investment when firms
have difficulties raising new capital. In essence, more constrained firms have a bigger
sensitivity of investment to debt repayment. Hence, this investment-debt sensitivity
can be a good proxy for financial constraints. In the data, one standard deviation
increase in debt repayment leads to a more than 10% reduction in the investment
rate for the constrained firms.2 The same increase in debt repayment only leads
to a less than 3% reduction in the investment rate for the relatively unconstrained
firms. Moreover, the investment-debt sensitivity measure is unlikely to suffer from the
endogeneity problem that undermines the validity of investment-cash flow sensitivity.3
Finally, the investment-debt sensitivity performs well for all subperiods from 1967 to
2011. This means that the measure is reliable through time.
Unlike any of the existing models which use a constant maturity structure de-
cided at time 0, my model allows the firm to adjust its level of short and long-term
debt every period according to its new financial strength and new capital market
conditions. Despite its dynamic nature, the model is simple and tractable. Hence, it
allows for rich characterizations of the firm’s dividends, investments, short-term and
long-term financing decisions. The model highlights the effects of firms’ current net
worth and existing long-term debt on their dividend payout and new debt issuance
policies. It predicts that firms will use more long-term debt when facing better future
1If we assume that all debts maturing within 3 years have an average maturity of 2 years and all
debts maturing after 3 years have an average maturity of 15 years, then the average debt maturity
is 7.5 years. Under the same assumption, firms shorten their debt maturity by half a year after
increases in competition.
2The investment rate is the ratio of new investment to existing capital. It is calculated as new
capital expenditure divided by current net property, plant and equipment.
3When cash flows are persistent and when marginal Q fails to capture all information on invest-
ment opportunities, current cash flows are naturally correlated with investments. Also, see Erickson
and Whited (2000, 2012) for measurement errors in marginal Q.
3
productivity. It also predicts that holding net worth constant, firms with proportion-
ally more long-term debt pay more dividends. I try to test those implications with
a quasi-natural experiment from exogenous drops in import tariffs. With fixed costs,
the model explains why firms sometimes choose to save cash instead of paying down
outstanding debt. A two period version of the model also allows me to explore how
the changes in future investment perspectives affect the current trade-off between
short and long-term debt.
The collateral constraints in my model are closely related to those derived from
limited contract enforcement. Unlike in Kehoe and Levine (1993, 2001, 2008), the
firm in my model can run away with a fraction of the capital without being excluded
from external capital markets. Rampini and Vishwanathan (2010, 2013) give detailed
derivations of collateral constraints from a dynamic model with limited enforcement.
With complete markets, the firm in their model can engage in risk managements by
contracting against a particular future state. However, the firm in my model can only
borrow non-state contingent debt. In this aspect, my collateral constraints are similar
to those in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), except there are two types of debt and they
both have to be collateralized against the firms’ capital. This collateral constraint
fixes the maximum leverage that can be achieved by any mix of short and long-term
borrowing. It provides a clean and tractable way of modeling the advantage of short-
term debt over long-term debt in raising capital because short-term debt permits
higher leverage. My model offers a starting point for models that allow for dynamic
maturity choices.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I first introduce the baseline
model and prove some standard results and properties. I also derive the optimality
conditions and give interpretations. In Section 1.3, I characterize the firm’s dividend
policy. In particular I show that under some financing conditions, firms’ dividend
policies depend on both their net worth and existing debt. In Section 1.4, I discuss
4
about the effect of the financing shock and describe the optimal long-term debt choices
for firms with different levels of net worth. In Section 1.5, I show some numerical
results and give some intuitions about firms’ optimal policy when there is fixed cost
for issuing long-term debt and how it differs from the baseline model. In Section 1.6,
I present a 2-period model and explain the effects of investment opportunity on firms’
debt maturity choices. In Section 1.7, I provide some empirical results that verify my
model predictions and propose a new measure for financial constraints. In Section
1.8, I relate my work to existing literature. Finally, in Section 1.9, I summarize the
main results. The proofs are presented in the appendix.
1.2 Environment
I consider an environment with two independent exogenous shocks that affect a firm’s
debt capacity and investment needs. First, with probability pi, the capital market
freezes, hence the firm is unable to raise new capital. The assumption that the
firm loses access to external market with probability pi, is merely a simplified way of
modeling financing shocks. In practice, the cost of external financing may fluctuate
exogenously (to the firm) when the lenders experience some supplier side shocks.
Hence, the transaction fee, the price, the interest rate, or the terms (such as maturity
or covenants) on a debt may vary from time to time even if the firm’s characteristics
stay the same. For simplicity, I lump all those adverse changes into the inability of
borrowing new debt. Of course, it is more or less the most extreme case of financing
shock.
Second, the firm’s productivity is stochastic. In each period, the productivity
realizes after the firm makes investment and financing decisions. When experiencing
low productivity realizations, the firm is short on internal resources because cash
flows are low. Consequently, it has to borrow more to maintain the same level of
production. When external financing is prevented by market freezes, the firm is force
5
to downsize and forgo good investment opportunities.
1.2.1 Debt financing
In this partial equilibrium model, the lenders have deep pockets in all times and
states. They are willing to lend in long-term at a return RL and in short-term at
a return RS   RL. Importantly, I assume that debt contracts cannot be written
contingent on the realizations of the two financing shocks.
Moreover, I assume that the firm can not save by lending in long term at rate
RL to prevent any firm from borrowing at RS and lending at RL simultaneously.
Equivalently, I can assume that the collateralizability of the long-term lending is very
low due to illiquidity in the secondary market for long-term debt. Hence, saving
through long-term lending significantly reduces the amount that the firm can borrow
with short-term debt. Since the firm’s production technology is average sufficiently
good, it will not try to save through long-term lending.
On the other hand, the firm can borrow long-term debt at a higher rate RL, and
save the unused resources at a low rate RS. Since long-term debt is valuable in terms
of helping the firm in endure times with refinancing difficulties, the firm might want
to keep the same level of long-term debt even when experiences bad productivity
shock currently. However, in order for the firm to satisfy the collateral constraint,
it has to now save in short-term and use that saving as collateral. Alternatively, we
can view it as that the firm needs to save cash instead of investing in capital in order
not to violate some covenants from long-term debt. For example, saving cash instead
of investing in fixed capital can help the firm maintaining a minimal current ratio,
especially when the firm experiences low recent cash flows.
In practice, suppose the firm invests in any type T-bill or money market funds,
then the amount will be deducted from short-term debt. Since those saving vehicles
are highly liquidity and bear low interest rates and since the firm can choose to sell
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those investment at any time to invest in capital or pay down debt, those savings will
be considered negative short-term debt regardless their actual maturities.
Finally, if the firm does not have enough cash flow to pay for its debt obligation,
it can always choose to sell its capital. The capital depreciates at rate δ per period.
Also, the firm can always run away with all cash flows and a fraction θ of the remaining
capital. Hence, all liabilities of the firm have to be collateralized by its capital. More
specifically, I implement the following constraint:
θp1 δqk ¥ RSbS  RLbL, (1.1)
The constraint requires the collateralizable fraction, p1  θq, of the un-depreciated
capital, p1 δqk, to be greater or equal to the total amount of interests and principal
repayments for both long-term and short-term debt. With this collateral constraint,
the firm never defaults. I can assume the prices of both types of debt to be one
instead of having endogenous bond prices derived from probabilities of defaults. This
makes the model more tractable. Also, collateral constraint can be derived from a
micro-problem of limited enforcement. Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) show that
in their set up limited enforcement is equivalent to one-period state-contingent debt
subject to collateral constraints. In practice firms do either implicitly or explicit
borrow against their tangible assets (see Rampini and Viswanathan (2013) for the
importance of tangible assets and collateralized financing).
1.2.2 Firm’s problem
The firm’s problem is as follows. At the beginning of each period, the firm learns
whether the financing shock realizes (i.e. s  0 or 1) before making any investment
and financing decision. If the financing shock occurs (s  0q, then it will not be able
to raise new capital (though either short-term or long-term debt). Given the financing
conditions, productivity state, its current net worth w, and its existing long-term debt
bL , the firm chooses dividend d, capital k, next period net worth wpz
1q for each state
7
z1, and non-state-contingent short-term and long-term debt bS and bL, to maximize
the discounted expected value of dividends:
V pw, bL , z, sq  max
td,k,bL,wpz1q,bSuP<3 Z  <
d  β
» "
piV pwpz1q, bL, z
1, 0q
  p1 piqV pwpz1q, bL, z
1, 1q
*
dQZ , (1.2)
subject to the budget constraints
w   bS   bL ¥ d  k (1.3)
Apz1qfpkq   p1 δqk RSbS RLbL ¥ wpz
1q @z1 P Z, (1.4)
the collateral constraint
θp1 δqk ¥ RSbS  RLbL, (1.5)
and the financing constraints
bL ¥ bL, for s  0, (1.6)
0 ¥ bS, for s  0, (1.7)
In the program in p1.2q-p1.7q, due to limited liability and since I do not consider
equity issuance, dividends d and net worth wpz1q are non-negative. Moreover, capital
k and long-term debt d are also required to be non-negative. I write the budget con-
straints p1.3q and p1.4q as inequality constraints to make the constrained set convex,
despite the fact that both constraints are binding for any optimal policy. There are
two endogenous state variables, net worth w and total long-term debt outstanding in
last period bL (here after, I refer to it as existing long-term debt). However, by setup,
the optimal policy does not depend on existing long-term debt bL when the firm has
access to external market (i.e. s  1). Indeed, the variable bL is not present in the
value function nor in the constraints when the firm has access to external market
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since the firm can freely adjust its capital and debt structure. Hence bL is only a
state variable when financing shock occurs (i.e. s  0).
I also require that production function and productivity shocks to satisfy the
following assumptions.
Assumption 1. f is strictly increasing, strictly concave, fp0q  0, limkÑ0 fkpkq 
 8, and limkÑ 8 fkpkq  0.
Assumption 2. For all z, zˆ P Z such that zˆ ¡ z, (i) Apzˆq ¡ Apzq and (ii) Apzq ¡ 0.
To simplify notations, I use x to denote the choice variables, x  rd, k, bL, wpz
1q, bSs,
and use Γpw, bL , z, sq to denote the constraint set given state variables w, b

L , z, and
s. Thus, Γpw, bL , z, sq is the set of x P <3 Z   < such that p1.3q-p1.7q are satisfied.
Also I define an operator T as
pTfqpw, bL , z, sq  max
xPΓpw,bL ,z,sq
d  β
» "
pV pwpz1q, bL, z
1, 0q   p1 pqV pwpz1q, bL, z
1, 1q
*
dQZ
In the proposition below, I prove that the firm’s problem is well behaved and has
an unique fixed value function V .
Proposition 1. (i) Γpw, bL , z, sq is convex, given pw, b

L , z, sq, and jointly convex in
w, b. (ii) Γpw, bL , z, sq is monotone (increasing) in w in the sense that w ¤ wˆ
implies Γpw, bL , z, sq  Γpwˆ, b

L , z, sq. Γpw, b

L , z, sq is monotone (decreasing) in b

L
in the sense that bL ¤ bˆ

L implies Γpw, bˆ

L , z, sq  Γpw, b

L , z, sq. (iii) The operator
T satisfies Blackwell’s conditions and there exists a unique fixed point V . (iv)
V is continuous, strictly increasing in w. V is continuous, decreasing in b. And
V is jointly concave in w and b. (v) V pw, bL , z, sq is strictly concave in w for
w P inttw : dpw, bL , z, sq  0u. When s  0 and b
   1pL
pL
w, V pw, bL , 1, 0q is
strictly (jointly) concave in w and bL for tw, b

Lu P intttw, b

Lu : dpw, b

L , z, 0q  0,
b   1pL
pL
wu.
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Let µ, βµpz1qpipz, z1q, βλ, γl, and γs be the multipliers on constraints p1.3q, p1.4q,
p1.5q, p1.6q, and p1.7q respectively. Also, let νd and νbL be the multipliers on the
constraints d ¥ 0 and bL ¥ 0. Finally, I will show in Lemma 6 that k ¡ 0 and
wpz1q ¡ 0 @z1 P Z.
From the envelop conditions and FOC with respect to d, I derive the following
equations:
V1pw, b

L , z, sq  µ  1  νd. (1.8)
V2pw, b

L , z, 0q  γl
Hence, the marginal value of (current) net worth is equal to the value of dividend.
The marginal value of existing long-term debt is equal to the multiplier on the credit
constraint p1.6q when s  0. In another word, the value of having additional long-
term debt is that it relaxes the credit constraint on long-term debt. However, when
s  1, there is no value of having long-term debt, since the firm can borrow new
long-term debt anyway.
The capital k, short-term debt bS, and long-term debt bL decisions are governed
by the following FOCs respectively:
BV
Bk
: µ  β
»
rApz1qfkpkq   p1  δqs
"
piµpwpz1q, bL, z
1, 0q   p1  piqµpwpz1q, bL, z
1, 1q
*
dQZ
  βθp1  δqλ (1.9)
BV
BbS
: µ  β
» "
piµpwpz1q, bL, z
1, 0q   p1  piqµpwpz1q, bL, z
1, 1q
*
dQZRS   βλRS   γs1s0
(1.10)
BV
BbL
: µ  β
» "
piµpwpz1q, bL, z
1, 0q   p1  piqµpwpz1q, bL, z
1, 1q
*
dQZRL   βλRL   γl1s0
 βpi
»
z1¥z¯
γlpwpz
1q, bL, z
1, 0qdQZ  νbL
(1.11)
10
The first two FOCs are quite standard except that when s  0, the firm may be
constrained because it can not raise new capital. The shadow cost of that constraint
is γs. The last equation states that when the firm chooses new long-term debt level,
it also takes into account the value the long-term debt might have in future when
the financing shock hits. More specifically, that value is βpi
³
z1¥z¯
γlpwpz
1q, bl, z
1, 0qdQZ
which depends on both the probability of financing shock pi and the realizations of
the productivity shock z1. Also, note that when net worth is too low, the collateral
constraint will bind. Hence, for z1 such that wpz1q  
1R1L θp1δq
R1L θp1δq
bL, long-term debt
will not affect the firm’s choices. So, γlpwpz
1q, bL, z
1, 0q  0 for sure. The cut-off level,
z¯ is defined by wpz¯q 
1R1L θp1δq
R1L θp1δq
bL.
Now I start to characterize the firm’s optimal policy relation to its current state.
Proposition 2. There exists a state-contingent threshold lever of net worth, above
which the firm pays dividends. Firms with net worth above the threshold make the
same capital, debt, and end period net worth decision: (i) D w¯pbL , z, sq s.t. @ w ¤ w¯,
d  0 and @ w ¡ w¯, µ  1, d ¡ 0. (ii) Also, @ w ¡ w¯pbL , z, sq, rdo, ko, bL,o, bS,o
wopz
1qs  rw  w¯pzq, k¯o, b¯L,o, b¯S,o w¯opz
1qs where rw¯pzq, k¯o, b¯L,o, b¯S,o w¯opz
1qs attains
V pw¯pbL , z, sq, b

L , z, sq. (iii) Finally, xo is unique for all w, b

L , z, s.
As typical in models with decreasing return to scale and collateral constraint, the
firm optimally chooses to invest all resource in capital when net worth is low. As
the firm accumulates more net worth, it becomes less constrained since the marginal
return on capital follows. Eventually, the firm starts to pay out dividend when it has
sufficiently high net worth and is operating with a high level of capital. From that
point on, any additional resource will have a marginal value of one. Hence, when net
worth is sufficiently high, the optimal choices for capital, debts, and end period net
worth are fixed and the firm pays out all additional resource as dividends.
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Result 3. Under the stationary distribution, firms with sufficient net worth never
reduce their long-term debt level when refinancing is difficult. (i.e. when s  0 and
R1L θp1δq
1R1L θp1δq
w ¡ bL , bL  b

L @pw, b

L , z, 0q)
The Result 3 states that the firm is always constrained by the amount of existing
long-term debt it has as long as it has sufficient net worth to support its current level
of long-term debt. The intuition is as follows.
The firm can increase long-term debt only when it has access to external market.
Since using more long-term debt hinders the accumulation of net worth for future and
the firm value is always increasing in net worth, the firm that currently has access to
external market will not choose to borrow with so much long-term debt such that the
firm will have excess long-term debt next period when it has no access to external
market (that is when s1  0). Therefore, under the stationary distribution, when
the firm has no access to external market, firm will always try to use as much long-
term debt as it can unless its net worth is insufficient to support its current level of
long-term debt (that is when
R1L θp1δq
1R1L θp1δq
w   bL).
When the firm does not have sufficient net worth compared to its old long-term
debt (that is when
R1L θp1δq
1R1L θp1δq
w   bL), it will still be collateral constrained when
without access to external market. In that case, the firm is forced to repay a fraction
of the existing long-term debt so that the new reduced level of long-term debt is fully
backed up by its new capital level. Hence, default never occurs as in the typical model
with collateral constrained.
Due to the complexity of the dynamic model, from this point on, I only discuss
model implications for i.i.d. productivity shock case. At the end, I will present results
on persistent productivity shocks in a simplified 2-period model.
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1.3 Capital and Dividend Policy:
The main focus of the chapter is centered around the idea that firms that finance
their capital more through long-term debt do not have to downsize as much when
refinancing is difficult because less debt repayment is due. Figure 1.1 illustrates this
point. The figure shows the optimal capital level as a function of net worth for each
of the following three cases: with external financing, without external financing but
with high long-term debt, and without external financing but with low long-term
debt. Following Proposition 2, for each case, the capital level is constant when net
worth is above a threshold w¯pbL , sq. Below the threshold, capital level is increasing in
net worth and dividends are zero. First notice that even when the firm has sufficiently
large net worth and existing long-term debt, it will still choose a lower capital level
when has no access to external market (from the figure, the flat portion of dotted blue
line is higher than the flat portion of the solid red line). The reason is that, when
without access to external market, the firm can not raise short-term debt which has
a lower interest rate. Thus, the marginal cost of funding must be higher than that
when the firm has access to external market. That means that the marginal benefit
from production must also be lower. And due to strict concavity of the production
function, the firm must operate at lower capital level when without access to external
market no matter how much net worth and existing long-term debt it has. Second,
when the firm has less existing long-term debt, it is forced to operate at a lower
capital level (region where the red line is above the green line). Hence, when the firm
is previously with access to external market, suddenly the financing shock occurs and
the firm is now without access to external market, it will have to downsize to a greater
degree since it has used less long-term debt previously.
This fluctuation in capital level is costly to the firm because when the production
technology is strictly concave, the firm sometimes has to pass on high returns on cap-
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ital. However, the firm may optimally choose not to smooth the fluctuation because
it is so constrained previously.
Finally, Figure 1.1 also shows that, when has no access to external market, the
firm postpones dividend when it has low level of existing long-term debt. Indeed, the
following proposition summarizes the observation.
Proposition 4. When financing constrained, firms with more long-term debt pay
dividends at a lower threshold. (i.e. w¯pb˜L , 0q ¡ w¯pb

L , 0q, @b˜

L   b

L)
Firms with more existing long-term debt pay out earlier for two reasons. First,
when firms experience financing shocks, they can keep a higher capital level if they
have more long-term debt from previous period because those debt are not due. In
fact, as previously mentioned, those firms do operate with more capital and use more
long-term debt currently (see Result 3). Second and consequently, they need less
internal net worth to support the same level of capital next period when financing
shocks occur. Hence, they optimally pay out the current extra resource as dividend.
As seen from Figure 1.1, the firm starts paying dividend when it is able to sustain
a certain level of capital and its marginal return on capital is sufficiently low. Since
the firm’s current long-term debt choice can affect the fluctuation in capital level in
future and since the firm starts to pay out when capital level is sufficiently high, the
dividend dynamics will be affected by the firm’s debt maturity choices. In partic-
ular, let’s consider a firm which has sufficiently high net worth and pays dividends
currently. Next period, if the financing shock occurs, depending on the realization of
the production, either the firm has sufficient net worth so that it can keep operating
at a sufficiently high capital level and paying a dividend or it has to defer dividend
and put more net worth into financing capital investment. When the realization of
the productivity and hence net worth are very low, the firm will have to downsize by
selling its capital to repay debt and interests.
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If the firm chose to raise more long-term debt previously, it will not have to
downsize as much when financing shock occurs next period. Also, the firm can still
pay out dividends in more states (productivity states) since in those states it can still
operate at a sufficiently higher capital level. On the other hand, if the firm raises little
long-term debt previously, it will have to downsize more and it has to omit dividends in
more states (productivity states). To illustrate this point, I keep all other parameters
the same and vary the probability of financing shock, p, as a comparative statics
exercise. The results are presented in Figures 1.2 and 1.3. In Figure 1.2, each line
shows the optimal next period net worth as a function of current next for a particular
existing long-term debt and financing state, pbL , sq. The point at which the line turns
flat is the cut-off level of net worth at which the firm starts to pay dividends. The
interval rwLpb˜

Lq, wHpb˜

Lqs represents the region in which a firm with existing long-
term debt, b˜L , would pay dividend if it has access to external financing but would not
pay dividend otherwise. However, if the firm has existing long-term debt, bˆL ¡ b˜

L ,
instead, the corresponding region shrinks to rwLpbˆ

Lq, wHpbˆ

Lqs  rwLpb˜

Lq, wHpb˜

Lqs.
In Figure 1.3, I present the same result in the net worth and existing long-term
debt plane. The solid parts of the two blue lines are the locus of different levels of
possible next period net worth for two different levels of existing long-term debt. The
segments rwLpb˜

Lq, wHpb˜

Lqs and rwLpbˆ

Lq, wHpbˆ

Lqs are the same as in Figure 1.2. The
shaded region is where firms with different levels of existing long-term debt would
pay dividends only if they have access to external market. Since the dividend paying
cutoff w¯pbL , sq is constant when the firm has access to external market and decreasing
in bL when financing shock occurs, the segment rwLpb

Lq, wHpb

Lqs shortens as the firm
has more and more existing long-term debt. This means that the firm has to omit
dividends in fewer productivity states when financing shock occurs if it managed to
raise more long-term debt previously.
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1.4 Short-term v.s. Long-term debt
In this Section, I describe the optimal short-term and long-term debt decisions. Due
to the complex nature of the dynamic model, I only give some intuitions and show
some numerical results.
1.4.1 Cash as negative short-term debt
Recently, many papers point out the fact that cooperations will save cash in case
they will have difficulty raising new capital in future. My model suggests that firms
can also use debt maturity management to help them endure times when financing
condition is severe. In particular, when are able to adjust their debt structure, firms
can control how much debt repayment due at the end of the period. When they expect
to experience financing difficulties, they reduce the amount due at period end. Hence,
firm’s cash and debt maturity decisions may be naturally linked. As illustrated in
my model, cash is equivalent to negative short-term debt. Therefore, only the net
short-term borrowing matters.
Of course there are other reasons for why firms use short-term debt and for why
firms hold cash reserves. Hence not all cash management activities can be viewed
as substitutes for short-term debt changes. However, based on the newly developed
theories on financing shock and cooperate cash savings, I believe that cash savings
are to a large extent driven by the firms’ concerns about future financing prospects.
Also, the rollover risk associated with short-term financing is well recognized. Hence,
firms’ cash management and debt maturity decisions should be interwind. Most
existing empirical papers on firms’ debt maturity choices never control for cash. It is
interesting to know whether their results could be overturned when properly taking
into account the connection between cash and short-term debt. Also, I think that to
what extent cash management affects the relation between firms’ debt maturity and
characteristics needs to be empirically investigated.
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1.4.2 Optimal long-term debt to capital ratio
Long-term debt level is in general increasing in net worth. The rationale is the
following. Let’s fix a given level of optimal long-term debt choice. When current net
worth increases, capital level increases and next period net worth increases. Thus,
there will be less next period states in which the firm will be collateral constrained
given the long-term debt choice. And there will be more states in which additional
long-term debt is desirable. Therefore, the firm raises the optimal long-term level
when net worth increases. However, proportionally we observe the opposite pattern
which is summarized in the next result.
Result 5. Under the stationary distribution, firm with more net worth chooses a
lower long-term debt to capital ratio. (i.e. bL
k
is decreasing in w for w P rwl, whs.)
Due to the strictly concavity of the production function (Assumption 1), when
net worth is low, the firm is more likely to have a next period net worth that is higher
than the current net worth. For example, when the firm’s net worth is lower than the
lowest net worth of ergodic distribution of net worth wl, its net worth is guaranteed
to be higher in all states next period. This means it can support a higher level of
debt next period. Therefore, initially in order to secure financing for the no access to
external market state, the firm has to raise large amount of long-term debt compared
to the relatively low level of net worth in current period. As current net worth
increases, on average, the ratio of next period net worth to current net worth drop
significantly. That is as the firm accumulates more net worth, its future net worth
will drop relative to its current net worth in more states next period. Especially in
some low productivity states next period, the firm will be forced to repay a fraction
of the long-term debt such that the new level of long-term debt is fully collateralized
by the firm’s capital. Thus, additional long-term debt does not provide any benefit
for those states. Hence, the firm finances less fraction of the capital using long-term
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debt in the current period.
Therefore, even though in terms of level, the firm still borrows more long-term debt
when it has more net worth, in proportion to current capital, the firm is borrowing
less long-term debt. As illustrated in the left graph in Figure 1.4, the firm uses
proportionally less and less long-term debt as net worth increases. Some papers
documented that the long-term debt to total debt ratio increases with firm size.
Others have found that the ratio increases with firm size for most the cases but
decreases with size for very large firms. My model suggests that when the firm is able
to adjust its debt structure, the optimal long-term debt to capital ratio is decreasing
in net worth.
One undesirable pattern delivered from the model is the fact that firm with low
net worth saves by lending out in short-term. This is shown in the right graph of
Figure 1.4 and summarized as follows.
Result 6. When the probability of financing shock is high, firms with low net worth
choose to save through short-term debt. (i.e. for small w, bSpw, 1q   0)
Once again, when the firm has low net worth, its next period net worth is likely
to be higher than that of today. Hence, the collateral constraint for next period
is relaxed and the firm is allowed to borrow more in the absence of financing shock.
Therefore, not having access to external market is very costly for the firm next period.
Consequently, it will use a lot of long-term debt today in case it won’t be able to
borrow next period. In fact, when current net worth is low, the firm will save with
short-term debt as collateral in order to borrow more long-term debt in current period.
However, in the present of a fixed cost for long-term debt, firms with low net worth
will not use long-term debt to raise capital.
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1.5 Fixed Cost of Long-term Debt Issuance
Now I reformulate the firm’s problem in a more general form with fixed cost of issuing
new debt. In particular, I assume that depending on the financing state, the firm
needs to pay a fixed cost φSpsq and φLpsq for issuing new short-term and long-term
debt. In practice, the issuing cost is higher for long-term debt and both issuing
costs are higher in bad financing state. Hence, the fixed costs have the following
relations: φSps
 q   φSps
q, φSps
 q   φSps
q, @s  ¡ s and φSpsq ¤ φLpsq, @s P S.
Hence, the baseline model can be formulated by letting φSp0q  φLp0q  8 and
φSp1q  φLp1q  0.
To explore the effect of fixed cost on long-term debt to firm maturity decision, I
keep all baseline setup the same except assuming φLp1q ¡ 0. Certainly, if φLp1q is too
high, then the firm will never use any long-term debt. Hence, I am only interested
in the case where φLp1q is such that some firms will raise additional long-term debt
when with access to external market under the stationary distribution.
In the present of fixed cost, firms with low net worth will only raise short-term
debt. The intuition is that when the firm has low net worth, it is very constrained
hence paying the fixed cost is very costly. Thus, the firm uses cheaper short-term
debt instead and tries to accumulate more net worth. As net worth increases, the
firm becomes less constrained and cares less about the current fixed cost. As shown
in the left graph of Figure 1.5, the firm does not raise new long-term debt when it has
low net worth (i.e. the optimal choice of bL is the same as b

L). Instead, the firm only
raises short-term debt as shown in the right graph of Figure 1.5. Then, as the firm’s
current net worth increases, the ratio between the firm’s next period marginal value
of net worth and current marginal value of net worth decreases. That is, the current
resource is not much more valuable then future resource. Therefore, the firm pays the
fixed cost and raises large amount of long-term debt so that next period it will have
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more resource from long-term when the financing shock hits. This corresponds to
Region A in Figure 1.6. Also, shown in Figure 1.5, this region is where the long-term
debt jumps up and the short-term debt jumps down. In fact, as shown in Region C
of Figure 1.6, there is a threshold level of net worth wˆpbLq below which the firm will
choose to not to raise new long-term even when it has access to external market. This
threshold depends on the firm’s existing long-term debt level. The higher the existing
long-term debt the higher the threshold. The rationale is related to the trade-off I
will discuss next.
Basically, the fixed cost introduces additional concerns for the firms that currently
have some existing long-term debt. More specifically, if the level of existing long-term
debt is high, the firm will not want to pay the fixed cost to raise additional long-term
debt. Since the benefit of long-term debt is somewhat proportional to the level of
long-term debt raised, there are economies of scale in using long-term debt. Hence,
only when the amount of new capital raised is sufficiently large, the firm feels justified
to pay the fixed cost. This corresponds to Region B in Figure 1.6 and can be seen
in region where optimal long-term debt choices equal to its existing level in Figure
1.5. Hence, when both net worth and existing long-term debt are high, the firm
also chooses not to raise new long-term debt. Finally, if the firm has high levels of
existing long-term debt but got hit by a low productivity shock, its net worth drops
and will have to downsize. However, now the firm will no longer choose to pay any
of the long-term debt, instead it saves the proceeds from capital sale by lending in
short-term debt. Then, it uses that short-term debt as collateral to support its high
level of long-term debt. The reason is that if the firm reduces long-term debt now, it
may have to raise additional long-term debt again. Hence, to reduce the chance that
it will have to pay the fixed cost again in the future, the firm chooses to defease the
existing long-term debt in order to keep all of it.
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1.6 Current v.s. Future Investments and Debt Maturity
For simplicity, I abstract from net worth effects for now and assume that the firm has
a linear production function. That is, ftpktq  kt and f
1
tpktq  1.
To facilitate the interpretation of the solution, I define the following terms. As in
Rampini and Vishwanathan (2010), I define down payment as the minimum amount
that the firm has to put down per unit of capital. In the case, it is one minus
the proportion borrowed with debt. Hence, the down payments with short-term
financing and with long-term financing are respectively, p  1  R1θp1  δq and
pL  1  R
1
L θp1  δq. Further, the reciprocals
1
p
and 1
pL
are the maximum leverages
through short-term and long-term financing. Notice that since long-term debt is more
expensive (i.e. RL ¡ R), short-term debt requires less down payment and offers higher
leverage. Later on, we will see that the firm trades off this benefit of short-term debt
with the cost of underinvestment. Now, I denote the net fully levered average return
on capital with RetpAtq  At   p1  δqp1  θq, the subscribe t denotes time. Hence,
if the firm only uses short-term debt, the net fully levered average return on internal
funds (net worth) is RetpAtq
p
. If the firm only uses long-term debt, the net fully levered
average return on internal funds is RetpAtq
pL
. Finally, I denote the ordinary gross return
on capital with RˆetpAtq  At   p1 δq.
Due to the linear objective at time 1, the firm either pays out all net worth as
dividends or invests as much as it can depending on the average productivity in time
2. If firm pays out all net worth at time 1, then at time 0 the firm is facing a one
period problem. It only needs to care about end of period net worth. Long-term debt
is never used at time 0 since it demands a higher return but provides no additional
benefit over short-term debt.
In order to focus on more interesting cases, I assume that the capital is sufficiently
productive at time 2, that is:
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Assumption 3. E1A2   p1 δq ¡
1
β
, @A1.
With sufficiently high time 2 productivity, the firm invests all resources in capital
and pays out nothing at time 1. Moreover, if it has access to external financing ps  1q,
it will retire all its current long-term debt and borrow only short-term debt until it
runs out of collateral. However, if the firm has no access to external financing, it will
be constrained either by its collateral or by its long-term debt holding depending on
the relation between its beginning long-term debt holding and net worth at time 1.
Hence, the firm’s time 1 decisions are straight forward.
Lemma 7. Under Assumption 3, the firm’s decisions at time 1 can be characterized
as follow:
• If the firm has access to external financing ps  1q, then
d1  0, k2 
w1
p
, b2  p
1
p
 1qw1, b
L
2  0, w2pA2q 
Ret2
p
w1.
• If it is without external financing ps  0q and poorly capitalized (i.e. bL1 ¥
p 1
pL
 1qw1), then
d1  0, k2 
w1
pL
, b2  0, b
L
2  p
1
pL
 1qw1, w2pA2q 
Ret2
pL
w1.
• If it is without external financing ps  0q and well capitalized (i.e. bL1   p 1pL 
1qw1), then
d1  0, k2  w1   b
L
1 , b
L
2  b
L
1 , b2  0, w2pA2q  ˆRet2pw1   b
L
1 q RLb
L
1 .
where w1 and b
L
1 are the time 1 beginning net worth and long-term debt holding.
And d1, k2, b2, b
L
2 are respectively the dividends payment, the capital level, short-term
debt holding, and long-term debt holding chosen at time 1. Finally, w2pA2q is the end
of period payout in each state of time 2 with productivity A2.
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Lemma 7 classifies three type of states at time 1 and characterizes the optimal
choices and payoff for each type. For convenience, through out the chapter, I call
the states in which the firm’s time 1 decision is constrained by its net worth the
“collateral-constrained” states. I call the states in which the firm’s time 1 decision
is constrained by its long-term debt holding the “debt-constrained” states. Since the
beginning long-term debt holding bL1 is decided at time 0 and because the time 1 net
worth is one-to-one and increasing in time productivity 1, I can define and solve for
the cut-off value for determining the last two types of states.
Lemma 8. There exists a cut-off value of time 1 productivity,A, defined by:
A 
"
A1 : w1pA1q 
bL1 pL
1 pL
*
. (1.12)
such that for all states above A, the firm is debt constrained and for all states below
A, the firm is collateral constrained.
At time 0 the firm chooses d0, k1, b1, b
L
1 , w1pA1q, to maximize the payout over the
two periods. The choices of bL1 and w1pA1q will determine which states are debt-
constrained and which are collateral-constrained. And at time 0, the firm knows
exactly what it will do in each state at time 1. Also, the return per capital only differs
between different types of states. Under parameterizations such that the collateral
constraint is binding at time 0, I can reformulate the firm’s time 0 problem in terms
of the ratio of optimal long-term debt to time 0 net worth, α 
bL1
w0
. And it can
be shown that the optimal long-term debt to net worth α, is pinned down by the
following FOC:
"
p1  piqE
RetpA2q
p
RetpA1q   piPrrA1 ¤ AsEA1¤A
RetpA2q
pL
RetpA1q
  piPrrA1 ¡ AsEA1¡ARˆetpA2qRetpA1q
*
ppL  pq
pLp
 piPrrA1 ¡ As
1  pL
pL
EA1¡ArRˆetpA2q RLs
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In essence, the firm chooses that optimal ratio such that the marginal cost is
equal to the marginal benefit of long-term debt. The left hand side of the equation
represents the marginal cost of long-term debt. It is the loss on the return on net
worth, which is the sum in the curly bracket, times the proportional reduction in
time 1 net worth. The right hand side of the equation represents the marginal benefit
of long-term debt. It is the gain from the difference between return on capital and
long-term debt interest rate times the proportional increase in long-term debt. So
the firm balances the loss from net worth reduction and the benefit from having more
long-term debt at time 1.
The following three propositions describe the effects of productivity prospects on
the firm’s maturity decisions:
Proposition 9. Firms with more persistent productivities proportionally use more
long-term debt (i.e. α increases with corrrA1, A2s.)
Proposition 10. When productivity shocks are independent, firms with better average
period 2 productivity proportionally use more long-term debt (i.e. When A1, A2 are
independent, α increases with EA2.)
Proposition 10 states that if the firm has better investment opportunities in the
distant future (at time 2), it will choose to use more long-term debt now. The
reason is that if the firm currently chooses a interior long-term debt level (α ¡ 0),
it must be that the proportional increase in long-term debt bL is a lot bigger than
the proportional decrease in time 1 net worth w1pz
1q caused by an increase in α.
Hence, if the return on capital for time 2 improves, the marginal benefit of long-term
debt raises more than the marginal benefit of time 1 net worth. Similarly, since
we consider a case in which the time 1 productivity is sufficiently high on average,
an increase in the correlation of the two shocks means better future productivities
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(at time 2). Therefore, the firm also increases its use of long-term debt when the
correlation between time 1 and time 2 productivities increases.
The results have some similarities to the project and debt maturity matching
story. Basically, if most of the returns will come from future periods, the firm is more
afraid from being cutoff of fund supply and hence won’t have enough capital to take
advantage of those good returns. Hence, it starts to use more long-term debt now to
secure the access of fund. On the contrary, if the firm high current productivity, it
will do the opposite as summarized in Proposition 11.
Proposition 11. When probability of financing shock is low, firms with higher current
productivities proportionally use less long-term debt (i.e. for low pi, α decreases when
A1 increases state by state.)
When the current productivity rises, there are two effects. First, the firm can gain
more from the higher leverage offered by the short-term financing. Second, because
the firm now will have more net worth next period on average, it can sustain higher
leverage next period. Hence, a market freeze will hurt the firm more. This second
effect makes the firm more willing to use long-term debt now, but it depends on the
probability of market freezes. When the probability, pi, is low, the firm cares more
about capitalizing the current gains with more short-term financing. The proposition
suggests that firms that use relatively less long-term debt are the ones that have good
current investment opportunities. However, firms with less long-term debt will have to
downsize more when experiencing financing shocks in future. When the productivity
shocks are persistent, this means that at time 1 when financing condition is severe,
capital is inefficiently deployed across firms with different investment opportunities.
The ones with high return on capital have relatively less capital. Whereas the ones
with low return on capital have relatively more capital since they used more long-term
debt previously.
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In practice, we do observe that firms with more growth options finance with more
short-term debt. Empirically, people have found that firms with higher marginal Q
and higher sales growth tend to have a larger fraction of short-term debt. Tradition-
ally this pattern is attributed to Myers’ debt overhand story. More specifically, the
firm with more future investment opportunities wants to have its debt mature before
the investment decision so that there will not be any incentive distortions between
the equity and debt holders. My model provides an alternative explanation. In the
present of both collateral and financing constraints, firms are trading off net worth
with long-term debt. When the probability of experiencing financing shocks is low,
firms with better current investment opportunities concern more about accumulat-
ing net worth and are willing to risk having to downsize more when financing shock
occurs.
Proposition 12. When financially constrained, firms use more short-term financing
as the cost of borrowing rises. (i.e. When θp1δq
R
is low, α decreases from a propor-
tional increase in both R and RL)
Last but not least, the model suggests that more constrained firms use more short-
term financing. This conclusion is profound but intuitive. The more constrained firms
borrow less from the financial markets. Hence, they rely more on their internal net
worth to finance most of their investments. As a result, they have less incentive to
hedge for future financing shocks. At the same time, since net worth is so important,
they want to build their net worth faster by investing more today. Therefore, they
use more short-term financing to increase leverage and production. This conclusion
is important because it improves our understanding of the relation between finan-
cial constraints and debt maturity. Prior research blamed firms for holding excessive
amounts of short-term debt under the belief that short-term financing made firms
more vulnerable to financial shocks, and frequent repayments due to a shorter-term
debt structure made firms more constrained. My model explains that firms borrow
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short-term debt precisely because they are constrained. Thus, it is financial con-
straints that cause more short-term financing, not the other way around. In the next
section, I use a natural experiment to empirically test for this direction of causality.
1.7 Empirical Testing
In this section, I verify my model predictions and explore its potential in three steps.
First, I test whether more constrained firms use more short-term financing. Second,
I propose a measure for financial constraints based on my model and examine the
performs of my measure. Finally, I show that the proposed measure is consistent
with the natural experiment I use for some of the empirical tests.
1.7.1 Financial constraints and debt maturity
In the literature, measuring financial constraint is very difficult. Simply showing
correlation between debt maturity and some exiting measures of financial constraints
is not sufficient because the measures themselves may not reflect financial constraints
well. Plus, even if the measures for financial constraints are precise, simple correlation
still does not show causality due to potential endogeneity and simultaneity. Therefore,
I use a quasi-natural experiment to show that financial constraints cause firms to use
short-term debt.
Previous literature has shown that increase in competition leads to higher cost
of debt, lower profitability, and less research and development for the firms that
experience that increasing competition (Valta (2012), Hou and Robinson (2006), and
Fresard and Valta (2013)). Hence, I think that firms who experience more competition
are more constrained. Therefore, I use exogenous shocks to competition as exogenous
shocks to firm financial constraints.
My main data consist of Compustat and international trade data from Peter
Schott’s web site. The sample period is from 1989 to 2005. I exclude firms in the
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financial (SIC 6000-7000) and utility (SIC 4400-5000) industries. Also, the sample
is restricted to those industries (mainly manufacturing) present in the international
trade data. I delete all observations with total assets less than five millon since the
very small firms tend to behave abnormally. I also require the observations to have
sufficient information for calculation control variables such as marginal Q, leverage,
asset maturity, etc. Main variables are defined in Table 1.8 in Appendix E. The
exogenous shocks to competition are define as follows.
I collapse the data to industry-years to compute the ad valorem tariff rate as the
sum of duties charged divided by the dutiable import value:
Ad Valorem Tariff Ratej,t 
°Nj
k1 Dutiesk,j,t°Nj
k1 Dutiable Import Valuek,j,t
(1.13)
where k indexes countries, j indexes industries, and t indexes time. I then compute
the change in the ad valorem tariff rate for each industry-year. Next, I compute the
median tariff rate change by industry. Following Valta (2012), an industry-year has a
“competitive shock” if the absolute value of the largest tariff rate reduction is greater
than three times the absolute value of the median tariff rate change for that industry.
Industries that experience competitive shocks are said to be treated. I exclude tariff
rate reductions that preceded and followed by equivalently large increases in tariff
rates. The summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table 1.1.
From those calculations, I define for each industry the indicator variable Postredu-
ctionj,t, which equals one if the tariff rate reduction has occurred in industry j by time
t. I identify 34 large tariff rate reductions in 34 three digit SIC code industries between
1989 and 2005. Then I estimate the following difference-in-differences specification:
Maturityi,j,t  αi   αt   λpPostreductionj,tq   β
1Xi,t   i,j,t (1.14)
where αi are firm fixed effects; αt are year fixed effects; Postreductionj,t is an
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indicator variable equal to 1 if industry j has been treated by year t, and zero oth-
erwise; Maturityi,j,t are the fraction of debt which matures in more than 3 year.
It is a measure for the proportion of long-term debt for each firm-year observation;
Xi,t is a set of control variables for each firm-year observation. I use white robust
procedure cluster standard errors at the firm level. Hence, my estimates account for
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. The results are present in
Table 1.2. The slope on the dummy variable Postreductionj,t is negative and signif-
icant. This suggests that compared to the control firms, the treated firms reduced
their debt maturity after the shocks that raised competition. This reduction is both
economically and statistically significant. As shown in Table 1.1, the average fraction
of long-term debt is 0.42. After the shocks to competition, the treated firms reduced
that fraction by about 7.9%. To make this number more accessible, let’s assume that
all debts maturing within 3 years have an average maturity of 2 years and all debts
maturing after 3 years have an average maturity of 15 years. The 7.9% reduction
corresponds to a reduction in debt maturity from 7.5 years to 7 years.4 If we believe
that higher competition leads to a more constrained environment for the firms within
the industries, the result suggests that more constrained firms use more short-term
debt.
1.7.2 Investment-debt sensitivity
Since my models link debt maturity to financial constraints, it can be used to de-
velop a good measure for financial constraints. Previous attempts in the literature in
constructing a proxy of financial constraint are somewhat unsuccessful. I think that
it is very important to have a good way to assess how constrained firms are. By far,
the most established one is Whited Wu index (Whited and Wu 2006). I will use the
4The percentage reduction in fraction of long-term debt is obtained by .033{.42  7.9%, where
.42 is the mean of “Maturity3” in Table 1.1 and .033 is the absolute value of the coefficient on
“Postreduction” in column (1) of Table 1.2. The average debt maturity is obtained by .42  15  
p1 .42q  2  7.5. Finally, the debt maturity after the shock is obtained by p.42 .033q  15  p1
.42   .033q  2  7.
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index and some other classifications of financial constraint to show that measure does
proxy for financial constraints.
From the model, we see that when the firm takes on large amounts of debt pre-
viously and has to pay it back, it become very constrained so that it has to forego
good investment opportunities. Because of this negative impact of debt repayment
to investment, I think the sensitivity from investment to debt repayment is a good
measure for financial constraints. Suppose that a firm is totally unconstrained and
it can always borrow as much as it wants. Then no matter how much debt it has to
repay, its investment decision is not affected because it simply borrows more debt to
satisfy both the investment and repayment needs. On the other hand, suppose a firm
is very constrained and it can not borrow any new debt. Then when this firm has lots
of debt repayment, it has to decrease investment dramatically in order to make debt
repayments. Therefore, I suspect that the sensitivity of investment to debt repayment
is negative and significant. Furthermore, more constrained firms should have more
negative sensitivities of investment to debt repayment.
In order to find the sensitivity of investment to debt repayment, I perform the
following regression:
Iit
Kit1
 αi   αt   β1  qit1   β2 
CFit
Kit1
  β3 
DRit
Kit1
  it (1.15)
where αi are firm fixed effects; αt are year fixed effects;
Iit
Kit1
are proxy for in-
vestment in year t for firm i; CFit
Kit1
are proxy for cash flow in year t for firm i; DRit
Kit1
are proxy for debt repayment in year t for firm i; I use white robust procedure and
cluster the standard errors at the firm level. For this excise, since observations are
not constrained by the availability of international trade data, I use all Compustat
data from 1967 to 2011.
The results for regressions using full panel are shown in Table 1.3. Indeed, we
see that the coefficients for DRit
Kit1
are negative and significant in both the regressions
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with and without additional control variables. The coefficient .264 in Column (Ba-
sic) suggests that one standard deviation increase in debt repayment leads to about
7.8% decrease in investment rate, Iit
Kit1
. Hence, debt repayment indeed has a signif-
icant effect on investment. Next, I examine whether the coefficients for DRit
Kit1
(the
investment-debt sensitivity) are more negative for more constrained firms. Since the
Whited Wu index, firm size, and dividend rates are so far the best proxy for finan-
cial constraints, I split the data into sub-samples based on those proxy for financial
constraints. Then I run the regression for each sub-sample and see if the coefficients
for DRit
Kit1
(the investment-debt sensitivity) are more negative for the more constrained
sub-samples.
Table 1.4 shows the results for regressions on sub-samples based on Whited Wu
index. As we move from the least to most constrained sub-samples, the coefficients
for DRit
Kit1
indeed become more negative and significant. For example, the sensitivity is
.352 in Column (5) but is only 0.071 in Column (1). This means that for the most
constrained firms (Column (5)), one standard deviation increase in debt repayment
leads to a 10.9% reduction in investment rate. However, the same increase only leads
to a 2.1% reduction in investment rate for the least constrained firms. So the effect of
debt repayment on investment is substantially bigger for the more constrained firms.
The patterns are the same across sub-samples based on size and dividend rate (Table
1.5, Table 1.6). Therefore, I conclude that more constrained firms have more negative
investment-debt sensitivity.
In unreported robustness tests over subperiods, the investment-debt sensitivity
remains reliable for all time periods from 1967 to 2011. Moreover, although the
amount of debt repayment due next year may be related to previous financing and
investment decisions, it does not relate to future investment opportunities directly.
Therefore, I believe most of the effect of debt repayment on investment depends on
how constrained the firm is. Hence, investment-debt sensitivity is unlikely to suffer
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endogeneity problems as investment-cash flow sensitivity does.3
1.7.3 Investment-debt sensitivity and the natural experiment
With the new measure for financial constraint, I now check whether the increase
in competition corresponds to increase in financial constraints. More specifically, I
examine whether the investment-debt sensitivity for the treated firms becomes more
negative after the increase in competition compared to the control firms. I conduct
the following regression:
Ii,j,t
Ki,j,t1
αi   αt   λ1
DRi,j,t
Ki,j,t1
  λ2Postj,t   λ3p
DRi,j,t
Ki,j,t1
 Postj,tq
  β1Xi,t   i,j,t (1.16)
where αi are firm fixed effects; αt are year fixed effects;
Iit
Kit1
are proxy for in-
vestment in year t for firm i; DRit
Kit1
are proxy for debt repayment in year t for firm i;
Postreductionj,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if industry j has been treated by
year t, and zero otherwise;
DRi,j,t
Ki,j,t1
 Postj,t is the interact between Postreductionj,t
and DRit
Kit1
; This interaction term captures the change in investment-debt sensitivity for
the treated group before and after the shock compared to that of the control group.
Hence, I test to see whether coefficient for the term
DRi,j,t
Ki,j,t1
Postj,t is significantly dif-
ferent from zero. In Table 1.7, we see that the coefficient for the term
DRi,j,t
Ki,j,t1
Postj,t
is negative and significant with or without additional controls. Therefore, the data
suggest that the firms which experienced the increase in competition become more
constrained after the shock.
1.8 Related Literature
One of the important elements of my model is the rollover risk caused by the market
freezes. Throughout the literature on debt maturity, all papers have rollover risk
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as the cost of short-term debt.5 Some try to explain how capital markets break
down. For example, Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) address financial institutions’
maturity mismatch problem in an equilibrium frame work. In the model, short-term
creditors may demand a higher face value on the new debt when their lending matures
and needs to be rolled over in states where default is more likely. Long-term creditors
bear the cost of increasing the face value. The bank (the borrower in their model)
is unable to commit to a single maturity structure. It optimally chooses to use more
short-term debt upon receiving interim signal regarding the probability of default.
Consequently, every creditor prefers to shorten its lending maturity and long-term
financing unravels. Focusing on the effects and implications of short-term financing,
Acharya, Gales, and Yorulmazer (2011) demonstrate that when the arrival of good
news is slower than the rate of rollover and when everyone is borrowing at short
term, liquidity dries up quickly and a market freeze may occur despite the fact that
the underlying asset quality is unchanged. This is due to the fact that, when a
debt is rolled over frequently, little information is revealed between rollover dates.
Thus, the difference in the debt capacities between high and low current states is big,
even though the fundamental values are almost the same. Both those papers provide
micro-foundation for the market freezes assumed in my model.
A variety of benefits of short-term financing have been introduced. For example,
short-term financing reduces the underinvestment problem caused by debt overhang
(Myers (1977); Childs, Mauer, and Ott (2005); Diamond and He (2012)). The idea
is that if debt matures and is settled before the firm decides whether to take a new
project, there will be no incentive distortion. In my model, short-term debt also
causes underinvestment because the firm has to use resource to repay the debt. Espe-
cially, when it experiences difficult obtaining new finance, the firm has to scale down.
5All theory papers mentioned in this section deal with rollover problem of short-term debt.
Other important papers include Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Leland (1998), He and
Xiong (2012a 2012b), and He and Milbradt (2013)
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However, short-term debt also helps to increase investment in current period since
it is borrowed at relatively low cost. So the firm’s main trade off is between current
investment and future investments.
Segura and Suarez (2013) have a model that is similar to mine. In their model,
short-term debt is relatively cheaper since it better accommodates preference shocks
that investors may experience. However, when preference shocks occur, the lending
supply shrinks dramatically. In deciding the optimal fraction of long-term and short-
term debt to use, banks trade off the lower cost of borrowing of short-term debt
with the higher cost when refinancing during systemic liquidity crisis. They conclude
that the banks’ optimal choice of long-term debt holding is inefficient. Government
regulations, such as debt maturity limits, Pigovian taxes, and liquidity insurances,
can make welfare improvements. Different from theirs, the main drive in the model is
the productivity shocks. The firm makes real investment decisions rather than having
a fix inflow every period.
In addition, short-term debt can be used as a disciplining device against agency
problems. In particular, many consider the problem of “risk-shifting” (Barnea, Hau-
gen, and Senbet (1980); Grossman and Hart (1982); Calomiris and Kahn (1991);
Leland (1998); Diamond and Rajan (2001); Eisenbach (2013); Cheng and Milbradt
(2012)). Others also build on the fact that short-term debt can help to prevent
managers from “empire-building”. With short-term debt, the creditors can decide
whether to continue the project if managers fail to pay. Since managers want to
continue negative NPV projects due to their private benefit, it is important for the
creditors to take control before things go awry (Grossman and Hart (1982); Benm-
elech (2006)). In my model, there is no incentive problem between the equity holders
and the managers. The benefit of short-term debt is simply the low interest rate. In
a dynamic environment, firms are more likely to take advantage of the low rate when
they need capital the most.
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Berglof et al. (1994) point out that when future returns are non-verifiable, short-
term debt can help the firm commit not to repudiate in the future, hence increases the
firm’s credibility. They argue that the more non-verifiable the long-term returns, the
larger shares of short-term debt are required. They predict that the use of short-term
debt increases with the amount of outside finance. In my model, larger fraction of
short-term debt usage also increases total capital borrowed due to higher leverage of
short-term debt.
The setup and predictions of my model are consistent with most of the empirical
findings. For example, Johnson (2003) documents that liquidity risk increases with
shorter maturity. In my model, firms with larger proportion of liabilities due in
short-term are more exposed to rollover risk and more vulnerable to market freeze.
Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), Barclay, Marx, and Smith
(2003) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) provide strong evidence that corporate debt
maturity is negatively associated with growth opportunities. They use current Tobin’s
Q as the measure for growth opportunities. However, Tobin’s Q could simply be a
proxy for next period return on capital. The model predicts that when next period
return is higher than the returns in longer future, firms use more short-term debt.
Importantly, my explanation is different from Myers’ debt overhang story. In my
model, firms use more short-term debt because they want to raise and invest more
today to capture the high next period return.
Recently, a few start to investigate the relation between aggregate debt maturity
and business cycle. Mian and Santos (2011), Broner et al. (2010), and Wang, Sun, and
Lv (2010) provide evidence that the corporate debt maturity choice is pro-cyclical. In
particular, Broner et al. (2010) show that short-term debt demands less risk premium
in emerging economies. Also, the relative cost of long-term borrowing increases during
crises. Hence, there is relatively more use of short-term debt during crises. Their
results support my setup for the benefit of short-term debt. Mian and Santos (2011)
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also show a general decline in the debt maturity from 1988 to 2010. According to
my model, I suspect that the decline is driven by reduction of hardship for obtaining
external finance due to improvement in searching technology and the development of
intermediaries and the capital markets.
Finally, to investigate the relationship between debt maturity and the underlying
assets, Benmelech et al. (2005, 2008) document that debt maturity increases with
the redeployability of assets, and verify that asset salability is also positively related
to debt maturity. For example when demand of the underlying assets is higher, firms
can use more long-term debt. Furthermore, Julio, Kim, and Weisbach (2008) find
that firms use more long-term bonds when financing investments in fixed assets and
use more short-term bonds when financing investments in R&D. My model provides
mixed conclusions on the relation between pledgeability and debt maturity. On one
hand, higher pledgeability means the firm can lever even more with short-term debt
relative to long-term debt. On the other hand, higher pledgeability implies a higher
refinancing risk for constrained firms due to higher leverage. Therefore, more detailed
and better designed empirical studies are needed to distinguish between the two effects
and resolve the mixed results.
1.9 Conclusion
This chapter tries to rationalize firms’ debt maturity decisions in the presence of
financing frictions that prevent firms from raising new capital. Firms trade off between
short-term and long-term debt based on the fact that long-term debt is more costly
but needs to be refinanced less often. Since firms are currently constrained by their
net worth, they do not borrow sufficient long-term debt as to fully smooth capital
between good and bad financing states. As a consequence, firms’ return on capital
and marginal benefit of net worth fluctuate with the financing conditions. Dividends
also fluctuate between good and bad financing states. In many cases, firms have to
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omit dividends when they experience financing difficulties. Especially, when firms
think they have higher chance of obtaining new external financing in future, they
borrow more short-term debt and less long-term debt. In turn, they have to omit
dividends in more states when the financing shock hits.
Moreover, with fixed costs, the model is consistent with the fact that small firms
do not use long-term debt. It also explains why sometimes firms choose to save cash
instead of paying down outstanding debt. Especially, when financing condition is
severe, firms with large amount of existing long-term debt relative to their net worth
would use cash savings as collateral to support their outstanding debt. In doing so,
they pass on good investment opportunities and high returns on capital.
In a simplified two period version of the model, I explore the effects of current and
future investment opportunities on firm’s debt maturity choice. The model speaks to
the pattern that firms with good investment opportunity use more short-term debt. It
shows that those firms are willing to bear the risk of severely downsizing and passing
on investment opportunity in future because they are more concerned about taking
advantage of current investment opportunity and growing more net worth. Using a
quasi-natural experiment, I verify that more constrained firms use more short-term
debt. Finally, I propose investment-debt sensitivity as a new measure for financial
constraints. The data confirm that more constrained firms are associated with more
negative investment-debt sensitivities. Indeed, firm debt maturity choice is closed
related to financial constraints and firm investment needs.
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Figure 1.1: Capital Choices.
This figure shows the optimal capital choices as functions of net worth for three
cases. The y-axis is capital level and x-axis is net worth level. The blue dotted line
is the optimal capital policy for a firm which currently has access to the external
market (s  1). The red solid line is the optimal capital policy for a firm which has
no access to external market (s  0) but with a high existing long-term debt level
bhL. Finally, the green solid line is the optimal capital policy for a firm which has no
access to external market (s  0) but with a low existing long-term debt level blL.
The parameter values used in the numerical example are listed at the top of figure.
I used fpkq  kα as the production function and Apzq is uniform distributed from
0.05 to 0.53.
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Figure 1.2: Dividends Payouts.
The figure shows two pairs of optimal next period net worth policies as functions of
currently net worth for the highest productivity realization. The y-axis is next
period net worth level and x-axis is current net worth level. The green and blue
lines are policies for a firm in environment with low probability of experiencing
financing shock (pi  pil). In particular, the blue dotted line is the policy when the
firm has access to the external market (s  1). The green solid line is the policy
when the firm has no access to external market (s  0) but with existing long-term
debt level bLppilq. bLppilq is the optimal long-term debt chosen when the firm is
paying a dividend which having access to external market. The red and pink lines
are policies for a firm in environment with low probability of experiencing financing
shock (pi  pih). In particular, the pink dotted line is the policy when the firm has
access to the external market (s  1). The red solid line is the policy when the firm
has no access to external market (s  0) but with existing long-term debt level
bLppihq. Again bLppihq is the optimal long-term debt chosen when the firm is paying a
dividend which having access to external market. The regions rwLpb˜

Lq, wHpb˜

Lqs and
rwLpbˆ

Lq, wHpbˆ

Lqs are where the firm will pay dividend if s  1 and will not pay
dividend if s  0 for the low pil and the high pih environments. The parameter values
used in the numerical example are listed at the top of figure. I used fpkq  kα as
the production function and Apzq is uniform distributed from 0.05 to 0.53.
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Figure 1.3: Dividends Payout Region.
The figure shows the stationary distribution of net worth under the ergodic. The
y-axis is (current) net worth level and x-axis is existing long-term debt level. The
red horizontal line is the dividend paying threshold when the firm has access to
external market (s  1). The green downward sloping line is the dividend paying
threshold when the firm does not have access to external market (s  0). b˜L and bˆ

L
are two levels of existing long-term debt with b˜L   bˆ

L Each of the two vertical lines
is one locus of optimal next period net worth when the firm currently has access to
external market and chooses long-term debt level b˜L or bˆ

L . The segments
rwLpb˜

Lq, wHpb˜

Lqs and rwLpbˆ

Lq, wHpbˆ

Lqs are the interval of net worth in which the
firm will pay dividend if s  1 and will not pay dividend if s  0 for the low pil and
the high pih environments. The shaded region depicts all such intervals of net worth
for all levels of existing long-term debt.
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Figure 1.4: Long-term v.s. Short-term Debt.
The figure on the top shows the optimal long-term and short-term debt policies as
functions of net worth. The y-axis is long-term or short-term debt level and x-axis
is net worth. The blue solid line is the optimal long-term debt policy and the green
broken line is the optimal short-term debt policy. The figure on the bottom shows
the optimal long-term debt to capital ratio and the optimal long-term to total debt
ratio as functions of net worth. The y-axis is the ratios and x-axis is net worth. The
blue solid line is the optimal long-term debt to capital ratio and the green line is the
optimal long-term to total debt ratio. wL is the lowest net worth level under the
stationary distribution. The parameter values used in the numerical examples are
reported in line above the each graph. I used fpkq  kα as the production function
and Apzq is uniform distributed from 0.05 to 0.53.
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Figure 1.5: Debt Policies with Fixed Costs.
The graph on the top shows the optimal long-term debt policy bL as a function of
net worth w and existing long-term debt bL . The x-axis is net worth. The y-axis is
existing long-term debt. The z-axis is optimal long-term (short-term) debt choice.
The graph on the bottom shows the optimal short-term debt policy bS as a function
of net worth w and existing long-term debt bL . The parameter value used in the
numerical examples are reported in line above the each graph. I used fpkq  kα as
the production function and Apzq is uniform distributed from 0.05 to 0.53.
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Figure 1.6: Contour of Debt Policies with Fixed Costs.
The graph summarizes the regions in which the firms’ optimal long-term and
short-term decisions show different patterns. The y-axis is net worth and the x-axis
is existing long-term debt. Region A is where the firm has sufficiently high net
worth and sufficiently low existing long-term debt. Region B is where the firm has
high net worth and high existing long-term debt. Region C is where the firm does
not have sufficient net worth but with low existing long-term debt. Finally Region
D is where the firm has too much long-term debt relative to its net worth. wˆpbLq is
the threshold above which the firm starts to pay the fixed cost and raise long-term
debt. The half green and half red upward sloping line is the locus of points where
bL 
1pL
pL
w.
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Figure 1.7: Value Functions for Two Long-term Debt Levels.
This figure is an illustration for the proof of Proposition 4. The top curve is the
value function for the lower long-term debt level bL . The bottom curve is the value
function for the higher long-term debt level b˜L . w¯pbLq and w¯pb˜

Lq are the thresholds
at which the firm starts to pay dividends for bL and b˜

L respectively. w˜ is the level of
net worth at which the slope of the bottom curve becomes higher than the slope of
the top curve.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics.
This table presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum value, median,
and maximum value for the variables used in the debt maturity regression
(Equation 1.14). The total number of observations and the number of ob-
servations identified as Post-reduction are also included at the bottom.
mean sd min p50 max
Maturity3 0.42 0.34 0.00 0.41 1.00
Log(AT) 5.33 2.07 1.61 5.10 12.42
Market NW 0.61 0.23 0.02 0.64 0.98
Marginal-Q 1.75 1.19 0.22 1.35 6.91
Oper. income 0.10 0.19 -1.11 0.13 0.56
Leverage 0.25 0.19 0.00 0.23 1.13
Asset maturity 8.23 6.18 0.30 6.53 28.22
CF Vol 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.32
Term spread 1.21 1.14 -0.36 0.83 3.06
Default prob 0.05 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.68
Whited Wu -0.27 0.11 -0.54 -0.26 -0.02
Observations 20282 Post. 8431
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Table 1.2: Financial Constraints and Debt Maturity.
This table presents the estimates from the debt maturity regression (Equation 1.14).
All variables other than Postreduction are control variables. The coefficient on
Postreduction is the difference in differences.  significant at 10%;  significant at
5%;  significant at 1%. t-values are given in the parentheses below the estimates.
(1) (2)
Maturity3 Maturity3
b/t b/t
Postreduction -0.033*** -0.027***
(-4.0) (-3.9)
Log(AT) 0.060*** 0.039***
(7.6) (8.6)
Marginal-Q -0.003 -0.014***
(-0.5) (-3.0)
Leverage 0.494*** 0.596***
(13.2) (21.8)
Market NW 0.137*** 0.046
(4.1) (1.5)
Oper. income 0.073*** 0.104***
(2.6) (4.8)
Default prob -0.167*** -0.316***
(-7.6) (-14.6)
Asset maturity -0.000 0.002***
(-0.0) (2.7)
Term spread -0.006*** -0.008***
(-3.2) (-4.0)
CF Vol -0.143 -0.340***
(-1.6) (-4.7)
Fixed Effects Firm SIC
Cluster Firm Firm
Observations 20282 20282
Adjusted R2 0.523 0.249
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Table 1.3: Investment Regression Full Panel.
This table presents the estimates from the investment-debt sensitivity regression
(Equation 1.15). The regression is conducted over the observations from the full
sample from 1967 to 2001. The first column shows the estimates for the basic
regression. The second column shows the estimates for the regression with addi-
tional control variables.  significant at 10%;  significant at 5%;    significant
at 1%. Standard errors are given in the parentheses below the estimates.
(Basic) (w/ Controls)
Iit
Kit1
Iit
Kit1
b/se b/se
qit1 0.079*** 0.072***
(0.002) (0.002)
CFit
Kit1
0.036*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.003)
DRit
Kit1
-0.264*** -0.252***
(0.018) (0.018)
ROA 0.153***
(0.019)
Leverage 0.034***
(0.011)
Whited Wu -0.033
(0.042)
CF Vol -0.029
(0.021)
Log(MV) 0.015***
(0.002)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm
Observations 73006 72461
Adjusted R2 0.357 0.361
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Table 1.4: Investment Regression Whited Wu Groups.
This table presents the estimates from the investment-debt sensitivity regression
(Equation 1.15). The regression is conducted over five sub-samples from 1967 to
2001. The sub-samples are constructed based on the firms’ Whited Wu indices.
For each year I sort all firms based on their Whited Wu indices. From the
left to right, Group (1) consists of firms with Whited Wu indices in the lowest
quintile in each year. Group (5) consists of firms with Whited Wu indices in the
highest quintile in each year. Higher Whited Wu index means the firm is more
constrained. Hence, from left to right, Groups (1) to (5) are increasing in the
degree for financial constraints. Group (1) is the least constrained and Group (5)
is the most constrained.  significant at 10%;  significant at 5%;    significant
at 1%. Standard errors are given in the parentheses below the estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Iit
Kit1
Iit
Kit1
Iit
Kit1
Iit
Kit1
Iit
Kit1
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
qit1 0.038*** 0.056*** 0.084*** 0.102*** 0.077***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
CFit
Kit1
0.107*** 0.085*** 0.057*** 0.041*** 0.011***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004)
DRit
Kit1
-0.071* -0.147*** -0.234*** -0.265*** -0.352***
(0.037) (0.031) (0.042) (0.047) (0.038)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 14585 14611 14604 14611 14595
Adjusted R2 0.506 0.483 0.468 0.380 0.278
48
Table 1.5: Investment Regression Size Groups.
This table presents the estimates from the investment-debt sensitivity regression
(Equation 1.15). The regression is conducted over five sub-samples from 1967 to
2001. The sub-samples are constructed based on the firms’ size (total asset value).
For each year I sort all firms based on their size. From the left to right, Group (1)
consists of firms with size in the lowest quintile in each year. Group (5) consists
of firms with size in the highest quintile in each year. Bigger firms are generally
less constrained. Hence, from left to right, Groups (1) to (5) are decreasing in the
degree for financial constraints. Group (5) is the least constrained and Group (1)
is the most constrained.  significant at 10%;  significant at 5%;    significant
at 1%. Standard errors are given in the parentheses below the estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Iit
Kit1
Iit
Kit1
Iit
Kit1
Iit
Kit1
Iit
Kit1
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
qit1 0.076*** 0.099*** 0.094*** 0.069*** 0.044***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
CFit
Kit1
0.023*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.055*** 0.074***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
DRit
Kit1
-0.412*** -0.313*** -0.293*** -0.203*** -0.087**
(0.044) (0.039) (0.041) (0.029) (0.034)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 14585 14610 14606 14610 14595
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.398 0.450 0.462 0.475
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Table 1.6: Investment Regression Dividend Groups.
This table presents the estimates from the investment-debt sensitivity regression
(Equation 1.15). The regression is conducted over five sub-samples from 1967 to 2001.
The sub-samples are constructed based on the firms’ dividends to EBITDA ratios.
Group (1) consists of firms with negative EBITDA. Group (2) consists of firms with
dividends to EBITDA ratios equal to zero. Group (3) consists of firms with dividends
to EBITDA ratios between 0 and 0.13. Group (4) consists of firms with dividends
to EBITDA ratios greater than 0.13. Generally, firms that pay more dividends
are considered to be less constrained. Also, firms that have negative EBITDA are
considered to be very constrained. Hence, from left to right, Groups (1) to (4) are
decreasing in the degree for financial constraints. Group (4) is the least constrained
and Group (1) is the most constrained.  significant at 10%;  significant at 5%;   
significant at 1%. Standard errors are given in the parentheses below the estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Iit
Kit1
Iit
Kit1
Iit
Kit1
Iit
Kit1
b/se b/se b/se b/se
qit1 0.071*** 0.063*** 0.053*** 0.029***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
CFit
Kit1
-0.029*** 0.172*** 0.164*** 0.102***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.015) (0.013)
DRit
Kit1
-0.301*** -0.296*** -0.127*** -0.099***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.031) (0.033)
Constant 0.183*** 0.256*** 0.197*** 0.188***
(0.032) (0.039) (0.017) (0.010)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 13727 18905 21411 18960
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.462 0.412 0.379
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Table 1.7: Investment Regression Reduction in Tariff.
This table presents the estimates from the investment-debt sensitivity regres-
sion (Equation 1.16). The first column shows the estimates for the basic
regression. The second column shows the estimates for the regression with
additional control variables.  significant at 10%;  significant at 5%;   
significant at 1%. t-values are given in the parentheses below the estimates.
(Basic) (w/ Controls)
Ii,j,t
Ki,j,t1
Ii,j,t
Ki,j,t1
b/t b/t
DRi,j,t
Ki,j,t1
-0.345*** -0.299***
(-8.6) (-6.4)
Postj,t -0.007 -0.048***
(-0.9) (-7.5)
p
DRi,j,t
Ki,j,t1
 Postj,tq -0.073** -0.060*
(-2.3) (-1.9)
qi,j,t1 0.080*** 0.071***
(19.6) (15.0)
CFi,j,t
Ki,j,t1
0.025*** 0.001
(5.7) (0.2)
Market NW 0.107***
(4.2)
Tangibility 0.196***
(4.5)
Whited Wu -0.299***
(-3.6)
Term spread -0.011***
(-7.7)
Year Fixed Effects Yes No
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm
Adjusted R2 0.430 0.427
51
T
ab
le
1.
8:
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
o
f
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s.
T
h
is
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
th
e
d
efi
n
it
io
n
s
of
m
ai
n
va
ri
ab
le
s.
C
om
p
u
st
at
d
at
a
ar
e
fr
om
th
e
an
n
u
al
an
d
q
u
ar
te
rl
y
C
om
p
u
st
at
d
at
ab
as
e.
B
on
d
y
ie
ld
s
ar
e
fr
om
th
e
F
ed
er
al
R
es
er
ve
B
an
k
-
S
t.
L
ou
is
.
T
h
e
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
of
“P
os
tr
ed
u
ct
io
n
”
is
st
at
ed
in
se
ct
io
n
1.
7.
1.
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
D
efi
n
it
io
n
M
a
tu
ri
ty
3
F
ra
ct
io
n
o
f
d
eb
t
d
u
e
m
o
re
th
a
n
3
y
ea
rs
.
T
h
a
t
is
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
d
eb
t
d
u
e
m
o
re
th
a
n
3
y
ea
rs
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
(L
o
n
g
-t
er
m
d
eb
t
+
d
eb
t
in
cu
rr
en
t
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s)
L
o
g
(A
T
)
T
h
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s.
M
a
rg
in
a
l-
Q
,
q i
,t
T
h
e
m
a
rk
et
v
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
fi
rm
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
th
e
b
o
o
k
v
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
fi
rm
.
T
h
e
b
o
o
k
v
a
lu
e
o
f
fi
rm
is
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s.
M
a
rk
et
v
a
lu
e
o
f
fi
rm
is
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s
+
m
a
rk
et
v
a
lu
e
o
f
sh
a
re
o
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
-
b
o
o
k
v
a
lu
e
o
f
eq
u
it
y.
M
a
rk
et
N
W
T
h
e
m
a
rk
et
v
a
lu
e
o
f
n
et
w
o
rt
h
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
th
e
m
a
rk
et
v
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
fi
rm
.
T
h
e
m
a
rk
et
v
a
lu
e
o
f
n
et
w
o
rt
h
is
th
e
m
a
rk
et
v
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
fi
rm
-
to
ta
l
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s
O
p
er
.
in
co
m
e
O
p
er
a
ti
n
g
in
co
m
e
b
ef
o
re
d
ep
re
ci
a
ti
o
n
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
la
g
g
ed
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s
L
ev
er
a
g
e
(L
o
n
g
-t
er
m
d
eb
t
+
d
eb
t
in
cu
rr
en
t
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s)
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s
A
ss
et
m
a
tu
ri
ty
(G
ro
ss
p
ro
p
er
ty
,
p
la
n
t,
a
n
d
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
(P
P
&
E
)/
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s)

(g
ro
ss
P
P
&
E
/
d
ep
re
ci
a
ti
o
n
ex
p
en
se
)
+
(c
u
rr
en
t
a
ss
et
s/
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s)

(c
u
rr
en
t
a
ss
et
s/
co
st
o
f
g
o
o
d
s
so
ld
)
C
F
V
o
l
C
a
sh
fl
o
w
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
p
a
st
ei
g
h
t
ea
rn
in
g
s
ch
a
n
g
es
to
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s
o
v
er
th
e
p
a
st
ei
g
h
t
q
u
a
rt
er
s
T
er
m
sp
re
a
d
T
h
e
d
iff
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
1
0
-y
ea
r
T
re
a
su
ry
y
ie
ld
a
n
d
th
e
3
-m
o
n
th
T
-b
il
l
y
ie
ld
D
ef
a
u
lt
p
ro
b
F
ir
m
d
ef
a
u
lt
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
es
ti
m
a
te
d
b
y
th
e
“
n
a
iv
e”
a
p
p
ro
a
ch
a
s
in
B
h
a
ra
th
a
n
d
S
h
u
m
w
a
y
(2
0
0
8
)
W
h
it
ed
W
u

.0
9
1

ca
sh
fl
o
w
/
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s

.0
6
2

in
d
ic
a
to
r
fo
r
p
a
y
in
g
d
iv
id
en
d
 
.0
2
1

li
a
b
il
it
ie
s/
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s

.0
4
4

to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s
 
.1
0
2

in
d
u
st
ry
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th

.0
3
5

fi
rm
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
L
o
g
(M
V
)
T
h
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
m
a
rk
et
v
a
lu
e
o
f
n
et
w
o
rt
h
.
M
a
rk
et
v
a
lu
e
o
f
n
et
w
o
rt
h
is
th
e
m
a
rk
et
v
a
lu
e
o
f
fi
rm
-
to
ta
l
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s
T
a
n
g
ib
il
it
y
N
et
p
ro
p
er
ty
,
p
la
n
t,
a
n
d
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
In
v
es
tm
en
t
R
a
te
,
I
i
,t
K
i
,t

1
C
a
p
it
a
l
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
la
g
g
ed
n
et
p
ro
p
er
ty
,
p
la
n
t,
a
n
d
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
C
a
sh
F
lo
w
,
C
F
i
,t
K
i
,t

1
(I
n
co
m
e
b
ef
o
re
ex
tr
a
o
rd
in
a
ry
it
em
s
+
d
ep
re
ci
a
ti
o
n
)
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
la
g
g
ed
n
et
p
ro
p
er
ty
,
p
la
n
t,
a
n
d
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
D
eb
t
R
ep
a
y
m
en
t,
D
R
i
,t
K
i
,t

1
D
eb
t
in
cu
rr
en
t
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
la
g
g
ed
n
et
p
ro
p
er
ty
,
p
la
n
t,
a
n
d
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
52
2Resource Allocation and Debt Maturity
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I studied a single firm’s debt maturity decision when facing
future rollover risks. Now I investigate the aggregate implications. In recent years,
many study the effects of capital misallocation on aggregate productivity (Moll (2014),
Midrigan and Xu (2014), etc). When financial frictions prevent the most productive
agents in the economy to raise enough capital, some capital remains in the hands of
less productive agents. Hence, the aggregate productivity is lower than the first best
level. When more capital is misallocated, the aggregate productivity drops more. The
use of short-term financing leads to more rollover problems. When old debt is due and
new external financing is difficult, productive firms have to downsize and are unable to
deploy enough capital. Therefore, capital is misallocated and aggregate productivity
falls. Naturally, it seems that more use of long-term debt in the economy can reduce
the rollover risks and alleviate capital misallocation. However, in reality long-term
debt may also cause capital misallocation. For example, suppose a firm issues a long-
term debt to raise capital for the current production, but it becomes unproductive
in all future periods; unless the firm can reinvest in the market at the same interest
53
rate or unless the debt is callable, the firm will have to produce at a low rate and
keep paying the interest on the debt. On the other hand, suppose an entity lends
resources with a long-term contact, then it comes across a productive project; unless
the entity can ask for early total repayment on the loan or it can borrow from the
external market, the entity will not be able to deploy enough capital for the project.
Therefore, when there are frictions in both borrowing and lending, whether long-term
debt can help reduce misallocation depends on whether productivity is predictable. To
what degree long-term debt is helpful depends on how predictable future productivity
is. The use of long-term and short-term debt on the aggregate level should be related
to the predictability of future productivity. In this chapter, I explore the connections
between idiosyncratic productivity and aggregate debt maturity. I show why agents
in the economy sometimes choose to allocate resources more with long-term debt and
other times choose to allocate more with short-term debt. I explain how changes in
the predictability of total factor productivity (TFP) drive variations in aggregate debt
maturity. I also exam the effects of debt maturity on misallocation and aggregate
productivity.
Conventional wisdom would say that when cash flows become more volatile, firms
will want to reduce the amount of debt repayments in the short run by borrowing
with long-term debt instead of short-term debt. However, looking at the problem
only from the firm’s point of view is misleading. In equilibrium, the interest rate or
the price of long-term debt is determined taking in to account of each firm’s incentive
to borrow long-term debt in order to endure times with high uncertainty. Therefore,
on the aggregate level debt maturity may not increase with rising uncertainty. In
fact, empirical evidence suggests that on the aggregate level, corporate debt maturity
shortens during recessions or during financial crisis. Usually, both real and financial
bad times are associated with high uncertainty. Hence, it seems that aggregate debt
maturity drops as uncertainty rises. With a general equilibrium setup, my model
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points out that the decrease in debt maturity is a direct response to the increase in
uncertainty in the idiosyncratic productivity. More specifically, the entrepreneurs will
use more short-term debt when productivity becomes less predictable.
The productivity process indeed changes from period to period. Some supports
are shown in the study of counter-cyclical uncertainty in production induced by de-
mand conditions (Bloom et al. (2007) and Bloom (2009)). Bloom and his co-authors
document that idiosyncratic productivity becomes more volatile following disasters
and in bad times. Also, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) point out that the dispersion
in productivity of firms is counter-cyclical. The increase in the volatility of TFP in
bad times could lead to a counter-cyclical dispersion. Moreover, as I will show in this
chapter, productivity is more persistent during expansions and less persistent during
recessions. Both facts suggest that future productivity is harder to predict during
economic downtown. Taking those facts as given, I build a dynamic general equi-
librium model in which entrepreneurs can at times allocate capital resources among
one another subject to collateral constraints. Other times entrepreneurs may fail
to find counter-parties, hence they may not be able to borrow or lend in the current
period. With persistent productivity and potential future exclusion from external cap-
ital market, entrepreneurs have incentives to arrange long-term transfer of resources
while they are able to borrow and lend. The degree to which the entrepreneurs
will conduct long-term transfer depends on how well they can predict their future
productivity. When productivity can be more precisely predicted, the entrepreneurs
will transfer more through long-term borrowing and lending. In the extreme case,
suppose the productivity is permanent and constant, the entrepreneurs will always
use long-term debt and never use any short-term debt. However, if the productivity
is serially uncorrelated, then the entrepreneurs may not use long-term debt at all
since the resource is likely to be stuck in the wrong hand in the future. Hence, it
is better for the entrepreneurs to reallocate every period with short-term debt. My
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model provides guidelines on how the predictability of the idiosyncratic TFP relates
to aggregate debt maturity. In particular, my model explains that counter-cyclical
predictability of TFP leads to pro-cyclical aggregate debt maturity.
The pro-cyclical aggregate maturity of corporate debt has been well documented
recently. Main and Santos (2011) find that the value weighted average debt maturity
of all corporate debt in the economy is longer in good times and shorter in bad times.
Although their original paper considers financial good times and bad times, those
periods mostly coincide with expansions and recessions. They conjecture that firms
take more long-term debt as a precaution against difficult times in future. In indeed,
they discovered that the firms with strong balance sheets lengthen their current debt
and expand unused lines of credit during expansions. On the other hand, firms take
on more short-term debt and draw down their lines of credit during recessions. Chen,
Xu, and Yan (2013) also document the same pro-cyclical pattern. In their model,
long-term debt reduces the firm’s default risks. However, the long-term debt makes
the investors more exposed to liquidity shocks. During an expansion, firms issue
long-term debt so that they may have less debt maturing in the near future. When
recession comes, risk premium rises dramatically, so long-term debt is too expansive
to obtain. Hence firms switch to short-term debt. I take a look at the issue from a
aggregate point of view. Instead of relying on the premises of counter-cyclical risk
premium, I propose that the pro-cyclical pattern of aggregate debt maturity is driven
by the nature of the productivity process.
Existing literature commonly blames short-term financing for exacerbating the
problems in bad times. My model suggests that the more use of short-term debt
can also be a natural responds to the increasing uncertainty in productivity. Be-
cause the productivity is hard to predict in bad times, more reshuffle of resources is
needed each period. Hence, more short-term debt is used. Indeed, my model shows
that with low persistence in TFP, the benefit of long-term debt is small and the loss
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in aggregate productivity is marginal. Nevertheless, the aggregate productivity of
entrepreneurs that are currently excluded from the external market is much lower
in the recessions than in the expansions. Hence there is a significant loss in aggre-
gate productivity from capital misalloction during recessions. Moreover, my model
quantifies the importance of long-term debt in alleviating capital misallocation and
preserving aggregate productivity when entrepreneurs are excluded from the external
capital market. Finally, my model illustrates that a financial crisis changes aggregate
productivity more dramatically in expansions than in recessions.
The rest of the Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the economic
environment. Section 2.3 presents the individual’s model and solutions. Section 2.4
describes the equilibrium and discusses the dynamics of the economic system. Section
2.5 investigates the relation of debt maturity and aggregate TFP. Finally, section 2.6
concludes the chapter.
2.2 Environment
In a frictionless economy, resources are always allocated to the most productivity
agents, therefore each realization of idiosyncratic TFP does not affect the overall pro-
duction on the aggregate level. Moreover, on the micro level, each agent does not have
to worry about future resource allocation, he only considers his borrowing or lending
decision on the spot for each period repetitively. However, When facing financial fric-
tions, entrepreneurs are sometimes unable to adjust their financial structure. Hence
they will tend to adjust more when they have the chance to do so. In particular, they
will use long-term debt to arrange long-term transfers in case they will not be able to
transfer in the future. When the volatility of the TFP shocks is high or when the TFP
process is less persistence, current TFP is less informative about future TFP. Hence
entrepreneurs would like to adjust through short-term contacts and adjust more each
period while taking more risk of stuck with suboptimal financial structure. To study
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this intuition more rigorously, I build a general equilibrium model with the following
setup.
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs each identified by his or her own net worth
a, existing long-term debt b, and TFP z. The entrepreneurs can borrow and lend
resources to one other, produce with capital and labor, and consume the output. The
entrepreneurs have log utility and discount future utility at rate β. Due to some
exogenous financial frictions, the entrepreneur may not be able to borrow or lend
with probability p. For future convenience, I say an entrepreneur is “in-the-market”
if he can borrow and lend and denote such a state with s  1. I say an entrepreneur
is “out-of-market” if he cannot borrow or lend and denote the state with s  0. The
exact micro-foundations for this frictions will be future works by itself. One could
think of it as a search friction where with probability p the entrepreneur does not find
a counter-party. The main results do not depend on this specific form of formulation.
In fact, I could use exogenous financing cost function that assign different costs of
borrowing and lending for a continuum of states.
In order to focus on the long-term debt’s role as a prearrangement vehicle, I stay
away from the entrepreneurs’ debt manipulating practice arise from the difference in
interest rates. To do so, I put restriction on the form of long-term debt payoff. I
require that the long-term debt pays the same as the short-term debt does when the
entrepreneur is in the market and pays a different rate if the entrepreneur is “out-of-
market”. So that the difference in interest rate occurs only in “out-of-market” state
where the entrepreneurs cannot adjust their capital structure.
The timeline is shown in Figure 2.1. Each day, the entrepreneur wakes up with his
net worth, a, and money borrowed last period, b. Also, he observes his productivity
z and learns whether he is “in-the-market”. If he is “in-the-market”, in the morning,
before production he can borrow new short-term and long-term debt subject to a
collateral constraint. Then, he uses the money (own and borrowed) to buy capital
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and hire labor to carry out the production. After the production, in the afternoon he
repays the interest and debt. More specifically, he pays the current interest on the
new long-term debt, rb, the interest and principle on old long-term debt, Rb1, and
new short-term debt, Rd. Finally, in the evening, he decides how much net worth to
keep for tomorrow, a1, and consumes the rest.
LetX summarizes all the macro state variables including the entire distributions of
both “in-the-market” and “out-of-market” entrepreneurs. Formally, an entrepreneur
faces the following problem.
2.3 Individual Problem
V pa, b, z, s;Xq  max
d,b,k,l,c,a1
lnpcq   βEz1tpV pa
1, b, z1, 0;X 1q   p1 pqV pa1, b, z1, 1;X 1qu
(2.1)
k ¤ a  b  b   d, (2.2)
0 ¤ a1   b, (2.3)
0 ¤ k, 0 ¤ l. (2.4)
for s  1 :
b  b   d ¤ pλ 1qa, 1 ¤ λ, (2.5)
a1 ¤ pzkqαl1α  wl   p1 δqk RpXqdRpXqb RpXqb c,
(2.6)
for s  0 :
a1 ¤ pzkqαl1α  wl   p1 δqk RpXqdRLpX
qb RpXqb c,
(2.7)
0 ¤ b ¤ 0, 0 ¤ d ¤ 0. (2.8)
As usual, the entrepreneur maximizes the sum of current utility and discounted
expected future continuation value. The expectation is over both the next period TFP
states, z, and market conditions (in or out of market), s. Constraint p2.2q says that
59
the total capital used in production must be financed out of the entrepreneur’s own
net worth and external borrowing. Constraint p2.3q makes sure that the entrepreneur
can only lend out as much as his own net worth at the end of the period. Collateral
constraint p2.5q states that the entrepreneur can only borrow up to a fraction pλ1q of
its net worth. Hence, one can think of λ as the maximal leverage for the entrepreneur.
The budget constraints p2.6q and p2.7q govern the laws of motion for the entrepreneur’s
net worth. The entrepreneur’s end of period net worth is his profit from production
net of all liabilities and consumption. Although the principle of the long-term debt
is not due at the end of the current period, I still exclude it from the net worth
calculation. Since end period net worth determines the maximal leverage for next
period, this definition of net worth prevent levering on borrowed money. Also, the
difference between constraint p2.6q and p2.7q is that when the entrepreneur is “out-
of-market”, he pays a different rate RL on the long-term debt. This rate RL will be
pinned down in equilibrium and it will balance the demand and supply of long-term
debt. Finally, if the entrepreneur is “out-of-market”, then he is unable to borrow or
lend through either short or long term debt as stated by the set of constraints p2.8q.
Next, I characterize the solution of the model. By setup, the capital, labor, and
short-term debt decisions do not involve intertemporal trade-offs. Also, while in the
market, the entrepreneur can always adjust the total debt level with short term debt
subject to the linear collateral constraint and non-negativity constraint on capital.
Hence, I can separate the problems in the following way. First, the entrepreneur
chooses capital, labor, and total leverage to maximize his current wealth. Then he
decides on consumption, end period net worth, and long-term debt. The short-term
debt will be the difference between the total debt and the long-term debt (both old
and newly issued).
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2.3.1 Capital, labor, and total debt
The solution to the entrepreneur’s within period profit maximization problem is sum-
marize by the following lemma:
Lemma 13.
kpa, b, z, 1q 
"
λa, if z ¥ z¯
0, if z   z¯
where RpXq  z¯pXqpipXq   1 δ,
pi  αp
1 α
W pXq
qp1αq{α.
kpa, b, z, 0q  a  b, lpa, b, z, sq  p
1 α
W pXq
q
1
α zk
First, the optimal labor decision is always linear in productivity and optimal cap-
ital level. When entrepreneurs are in the market, they lever up and produce at their
maximal scale allowed by the collateral constraint if they productivities are higher
than a cut-off level, z¯. Otherwise, they lend out all resources. When entrepreneurs
are out of market, they produce with all their resources regardless the productivity
level since they are living in autarky. Hence, the entrepreneur’s profits from produc-
tion, Πpa, b, z, sq  pzkqαl1αWl p1 δqk, for state s  0 and state s  1 can be
reduced to Πpa, b, z, 1q  maxtzpi   1  δ, 0uk and Πpa, b, z, 0q  rzpi   1  δsk re-
spectively. Those are standard results due to the constant return to scale technology
as in Moll (2014).
Lemma 14. Existing long-term debt b only affects short-term debt choice when
entrepreneurs are currently in the market.
When an entrepreneur is “in-the-market”, he can use both long-term and short-
term debt subject to a collateral constraint on the total amount of borrowing. The
maximum amount of resource he can borrow or lend is pinned down by his net worth.
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Plus, the long-term and short-term interest rates are the same. Hence, the old long-
term debt outstanding will have no effects. In fact, any old long-term debt outstand
can be counted towards short-term debt.
Therefore, the problem can be reduced to the following consumption-saving and
portfolio choice problem.
2.3.2 Consumption, net worth and long-term debt
With optimal profit and leverage, I can rewrite the remaining problem as a simple
consumption, saving, and portfolio choice problem:
V pa, b, z, sq  max
a1,b
lnpcq   βEz1tpV pa
1, b, z1, 0q   p1 pqV pa1, b, z1, 1qu
a1  rλmaxtzpi  r  δ, 0u  Rsa c, 0 ¤ a1   b, for s  1
a1  pzpi   1 δqpa  bq RLb
  c b  0, for s  0
where pi  αp1α
W
qp1αq{α.
Now let’s denote the returns on saving for states s  1, 2 as Apz, 0q  zpi   1  δ
and Apz, 1q  λmaxtzpi  r  δ, 0u   RpXq respectively. Basically, A(z,s) is the
return on net worth (or internal funds) for state pz, sq. Let ηa1 b be the multiplier on
constraint p2.3q. I obtain the following optimality conditions.
Consumption Saving: (proportion to be consumed) for s  0, 1
1
cpa, b, z, sq
 β
» 8
0
p
pApz1, 0q
cpa1, b, z1, 0q
 
p1 pqApz1, 1q
cpa1, b, z1, 1q
qψpz1|zqdz1   ηa1 b,
Portfolio Choice: (proportion in long-term debt) for s  1
» 8
0
Apz1, 0q RL
cpa1, b, z1, 0q
ψpz1|zqdz1   ηa1 b  0,
Since the entrepreneur can always use short-term debt to make up the gap when
he is “in-the-market”, The long-term debt decision does not directly affect the en-
trepreneur’s saving decision through the budget constraint when s  1. In general, if
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he thinks that he will likely be very productive next period, he will borrow through
long-term debt to reduce its debt repayments at the end of the period. Hence, he
won’t have to downsize as much even if he is “out-of-market” next period. On the
other hand, if he thinks that he will likely be unproductive next period, he will lend
in long-term debt and receive the riskless return of RL tomorrow.
With log utility, the saving decision is separated from the long-term debt in the
sense that the consumption and saving decisions are not affected by long-term debt
choice. When constraint p2.3q is binding, the entrepreneur lends out all he has, hence
b  a1.
Because of log utility and constant return to scale production, the decision rules
are linear in wealth. In our model, since total borrowing is constrained by net worth,
wealth is simply the product of net worth, a, and return on net worth, Apz, sq.
Furthermore, the proportional decisions on consumption, saving, and long-term debt
are only functions of current productivity level, z, and independent of the size or
wealth of the entrepreneur. Hence, I am able to characterize the affect of current
productivity on entrepreneurs’ decisions of what fraction of wealth they will consume,
save, and borrow/lend through long-term debt.
As long as zpi 1δ ¡ 0, our result does not depend on the domain of productivity
shocks. For convenience I let z P r0,8q. Assuming RL ¥ Epz
1|z  0qpi  1 δ, which
is always the case in equilibrium, I have the following solution.
Proposition 15. The policy function can be characterized as:
c  p1 βqApz, 1qa, b  φbpzqApz, 1qa, a
1  βApz, 1qa, for s  1
c  p1βqtApz, 0qpa bqRLb
u, b  0, a1  βtApz, 0qpa bqRLb
u, for s  0
φbpzq is defined by
# ³8
0
RLψpz
1|zq
pβ φbqpz1pi 1δqRLφb
dz1  1
β
, if z ¡ z
φbpzq  β, if z ¤ z
where z satisfies RL  Epz
1|zqpi   1 δ.
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Since I have the closed form solutions, I can easily conduct the following compar-
ative statics.
Corollary 16. Proportionally long-term borrowing φb is decreasing in RL.
Naturally, when long-term debt becomes more expensive, entrepreneurs borrow
less of it.
Corollary 17. Entrepreneurs with higher initial net worth (a), consume more, ac-
cumulate more net worth, and use more debt. Entrepreneurs with higher current
productivity (z) consume more and accumulate more net worth.
As mentions before, all decisions are linear in net worth, a. Therefore, with the
same current productivity, bigger entrepreneurs make decisions on a large scale. The
effect of z on long-term debt, b, is subtle. Current productivity plays two roles.
First, it contributes to current wealth. Second, it provides information about future
productivity. To investigate this second effect, I put a commonly accepted structure
on the productivity process.
In particular, I assume that the productivity shocks are persistent, so the cur-
rent productivity level can predict future productivity levels. Hence, more and less
productive firms today will make different proportional long-term debt decisions.
Assumption 4. Suppose for any z   z , ψpz1 q first order stochastically dominates
ψpz1q.
Under the assumption and from long-term debt policy given in proposition 15, I
have the following proposition.
Proposition 18. The optimal policy on long-term debt, φbpzq, is increasing in current
productivity, z. Moreover, φbpzq ¤ 0, for z ¤ z
b, and φbpzq ¥ 0, for z ¥ z
b, where zb
is defined by
³8
0
ψpz
1
|zbq
z1pi 1δ
dz1  1
RL
.
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In corollary 17, we see that more productive entrepreneurs consume more and
keep more net worth. However, for long-term debt that is not always the case. En-
trepreneurs with current productivity greater than zb are borrowers. For them, an
increase in z indeed leads to more borrowing. However, for the lenders, increase in
z leads to a reduction in proportional lending, φb, but an increase in current wealth,
Apz, 1qa. Therefore, total lending in long-term debt may either rise or fall. Also,
Proposition 18 suggests that on an individual level, debt maturity is pro-cyclical.
That is the entrepreneurs will borrow more long-term debt when productivity is high
as in expansion and borrow less long-term debt when productivity is low as in re-
cession. However, under general equilibrium, the interest rate on the long-term debt
may also increase. Hence, it is unclear weather on the aggregate level, debt maturity
is pro-cyclical. In the next section, I will investigate what happens on the aggregate
level under general equilibrium. But first, let’s give a specific form to the TFP process
for easier exploration.
Suppose the productivity process is: logpz1q  ρ logpzqσ
2
2
 σε, where ε  Np0, 1q.
I investigate how the persistence of productivity affects the long-term debt policy.
Proposition 19. φb is increasing in ρ for z ¡ 1 and decreasing in ρ for z   1.
The intuition is straight forward. For entrepreneurs with z ¡ 1, increase in ρ,
raises the condition mean of z1, hence the future investment opportunity becomes
better. Thus, the entrepreneurs borrow more long-term debt. The exact opposite
applies for entrepreneurs with z   1.
Proposition 20. φb is decreasing in σ.
When z1 becomes more volatile, the future investment is riskier, hence entrepreneurs
want to engage in more precautionary saving by reducing their long-term debt or lend
more through long-term debt.
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2.4 Equilibrium and Dynamics
Let G˜tpa, zq and g˜pa, zq be the cdf and pdf for the measure of entrepreneurs who are
currently in the market. Since, existing long-term debt does not matter when the
entrepreneurs are in the market. They can be measured simply with net worth a and
productivity z. Let H˜tpa, b
, zq and h˜pa, b, zq be the measure of entrepreneurs who
are currently out of the market. The competitive equilibrium is defined by time paths
of prices Rt, Wt, t ¥ 0 and corresponding quantities, such that (i) taking equilibrium
prices as given, each entrepreneur maximizes p2.1q subject to p2.2q to p2.8q , and (ii)
the short-term debt, long-term debt, and labor markets clear at each point in time:
»
z
»
a
ktpa, zqdG˜tpa, zq 
»
z
»
a
adG˜tpa, zq,
»
z
»
a
btpa, zqdG˜tpa, zq  0,
»
z
»
a
ltpa, zqdG˜tpa, zq  
»
z
»
a
»
b
ltpa, zqdH˜tpa, b
, zq  L.
The first equation is the market clearing condition for total resources. It states
that the total use of resources in production equals the total amount of resources
available at the beginning of the period. The second equation is the market clearing
condition for long-term debt. It states that overall there is net zero supply of long-
term debt since the entrepreneurs simply borrow and lend from one another. The
last equation is the market clearing condition for labor. It insures that at the current
wage level, all labor units are used by all the entrepreneurs.
The short term debt interest rate is determined by the marginal active (the ones
who produce) entrepreneurs in the market. Formally, I have the following relation:³8
0
³8
z¯
ag˜pa, zqdzda  1
λ
³8
0
³8
0
ag˜pa, zqdzda, where 1
λ
can be viewed as the down pay-
ment per unit of investment the active entrepreneurs must provide with their own
money. The relation states that the total amount of resources in the hands of active
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entrepreneurs is a fraction 1
λ
of the total resources that are in the market. Later I will
discuss in more details about how the short-term interest rate is determined. Next,
I discuss how to keep track of the distributions of both in and out of the market
entrepreneurs.
Each period, there will be a fraction p of the entrepreneurs are “out-of-market”.
Their decisions are simple and do not affect the interest rates of the debt. Hence, I
focus mainly on the distribution and decisions of the entrepreneurs that are in the
market. Depending on the realizations of their idiosyncratic productivity shocks, A
spectrum of “in-the-market” entrepreneurs can be obtained as follows.
For all the entrepreneurs that are in the market, the entrepreneurs with pro-
ductivity higher than z¯ will be active and produce. They borrow from the ones with
productivity lower than z¯. The entrepreneurs with productivity higher than zb borrow
long-term debt. Moreover, the higher the productivity, the more long-term debt is
borrowed. On the other hand, The entrepreneurs with productivity lower than zb
lend in long term. Furthermore, the ones with lower productivity lend more in long
term. Finally, there is a cut-off level of productivity z below which all entrepreneurs
lend all their net worth out through long-term debt. That is their optimal choice of
φb is β. The cut-off z is determined by RL  Epz
1|zqpi   1 δ.
Now I derive the distributions of both “in-the-market” and “out-of-market” en-
trepreneurs. Let gtpa, φ

b , zq be the measure of entrepreneurs who are previously
“in-the-market” with net worth a, long-term debt proportion φb , and productivity
z. Let htpa, 0, zq be the measure of entrepreneurs who are previously “out-of-market”
with net worth a, zero long-term debt, and productivity z. The long-term debt is zero
because the entrepreneurs cannot raise long-term debt if they are “out-of-market” in
last period.
For entrepreneurs that are previously “in-the-market”, their existing long-term
debt is decided in last period based on their productivity in last period zt1. I define
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the wealth share of “in-the-market” entrepreneur with long-term debt to wealth ratio,
φb , and productivity, z, as:
u1t pφ

b , zq 
1
Kint
» 8
0
a gtpa, φ

b , zq da,
where gtpa, φ

b , zq is the measure of “in-the-market” entrepreneurs with net worth a,
long-term debt
φb
β
a, and productivity z and Kint 
³8
0
³8
0
³8
β
a gtpa, φ

b , zqdφ

b dzda
is the total resources that are in the market.
For entrepreneurs that are previously “out-of-market”, the existing long-term debt
is zero. Hence, I can track their wealth share with productivity alone. I define the
wealth share of “ out-of-market” entrepreneur with productivity, z, as:
u0t pzq 
1
Koutt
» 8
0
a htpa, 0, zq da, (2.9)
where htpa, 0, zq is the measure of “out-of-market” entrepreneur with net worth a,
zero long-term debt, and productivity z and Koutt 
³8
0
³8
0
a htpa, 0, zqdzda is the total
resource that are out of the market. Similarly, the wealth share of the entrepreneurs
in the market with productivity z should be defined as:
ωtpzq 
1
Kint
» 8
β
» 8
0
a gtpa, φ

b , zq dadφ

b 
1
Kint
» 8
0
» 8
0
a gtpa, φ

b pzt1q, zq dadzt1,
(2.10)
where Kint 
³8
0
³8
0
³8
β
a gtpa, φ

b , zqdφ

b dzda is the total resource that are in the
market.
Taking in to account the measures of entrepreneurs both in and out of the market,
the economy as a whole evolve in the following way.
For entrepreneurs that are “in-the-market” in period t, I have the following laws
of motion for the wealth shares. First, the entrepreneurs that have productivity z1
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next period have wealth shares:
ωt 1pz
1q 
Kint
³8
0
Apz, 1qωtpzqψpz
1|zq dz  Koutt
³8
0
Apz, 1qu0t pzqψpz
1|zq dz
Kint
³8
0
Apz, 1qωtpzq dz  Koutt
³8
0
Apz, 1qu0t pzqdz
(2.11)
For z ¡ z, φbpzq is an interior optimal choice depending on z, so the wealth share
of the type pφbpzq, z
1q entrepreneurs is:
u1t 1pφbpzq, z
1q 
Kint Apz, 1qωtpzq ψpz
1|zq  Koutt Apz, 1qu
0
t pzqψpz
1|zq
Kint
³8
0
Apz, 1qωtpzq dz  Koutt
³8
0
Apz, 1qu0t pzqdz
(2.12)
For z ¤ z, φbpzq  β and the wealth share of the type pβ, z
1q entrepreneurs is:
u1t 1pβ, z
1q 
³z
0
Kint Apz, 1qωtpzq ψpz
1|zqdz  
³z
0
Koutt Apz, 1qu
0
t pzqψpz
1|zqdz
Kint
³8
0
Apz, 1qωtpzq dz  Koutt
³8
0
Apz, 1qu0t pzqdz
(2.13)
Finally, for entrepreneurs that have productivity z1 next period and are “out-of-
market” in period t, the wealth share is:
u0t 1pz
1q  (2.14)
Kint
³8
β
³8
0 tpβ   φ

b qpzpi   1  δq RLφ

b uu
1
t pφ

b , zqψpz
1|zqdzdφb  K
out
t
³8
0 βpzpi   1  δqu
0
t pzqψpz
1|zqdz
Kint
³8
β
³8
0 tpβ   φ

b qpzpi   1  δq RLφ

b uu
1
t pφ

b , zqdzdφ

b  K
out
t
³8
0 βpzpi   1  δqu
0
t pzqdz
Given the current wealth shares ωtpzq, u
1
t pφ

b , zq, u
0
t pzq and transition density ψpz
1|zq
for type z entrepreneurs, ωt 1pz
1q, u1t 1pφb, z
1q, u0t 1pz
1q keep track of the wealth shares
of entrepreneurs at the beginning of period t 1. Eventually, these wealth shares will
stay unchanged as the system reach its stationary equilibrium.
From Lemma 1, the individual labor choice is lpa, b, z, sq  p 1α
W pXq
q
1
α zk, hence the
labor market clearing condition for the economy is
³8
0
lpa, b, z, sqωpzqdz 
³8
0
p 1α
W pXq
q
1
α
zkωpzqdz  L. In equilibrium the wage is determined by the distributions of en-
trepreneurs both in and out of the market. More specifically, the wage is obtained
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by:
Wt 
rp1  pq
³8
z¯ λzpK
in
t ωtpzq  K
out
t u
0
t pzqqdz   p
³8
0 zpK
in
t
³8
0 p1  
φ
b
β
qu1t pφ

b , zqdz
  Koutt u
0
t pzqqdzs
α
p1  αq1Lα
(2.15)
The short-term interest rate is determined by the marginal borrower, which has
productivity z¯. Since some entrepreneurs that are currently in the market may be out
of the market in previous period, both the wealth shares of entrepreneurs in and out
of the market matter. The degree of financial friction and the distribution of wealth
shares of the entrepreneurs in the market will pin down z¯. More specifically, I have
1 1
λ

³z¯
0
Kint wtpzq   K
out
t u
0
t pzq
Kint  K
out
t
dz.
The long-term interest rate is determined by the market clearing condition for
long-term debt. With wealth shares and long-term debt policy, the condition states³8
0
φbpz,RLq
Kint wtpzq   K
out
t u
0
t pzq
Kint  K
out
t
dz  0. Finally, to find the total amount of resources in
and out of the market, I have the following relations. For total resources in the market,
Kint 1  p1pqtK
in
t
³8
0
Apz, 1qωtpzq dz K
out
t
³8
0
Apz, 1qu0t pzqdzu. For the resources out
of the market, Koutt 1  ptK
in
t
³8
β
³8
0
tpβ   φb qpzpi   1  δq  RLφ

b uu
1
t pφ

b , zqdzdφ

b  
Koutt
³8
0
βpzpi   1 δqu0t pzqdzu.
Now I investigate what affects the total use of long-term debt. From Proposition
19, I know that on the individual level, entrepreneurs with high (low) productivity
will borrow (lend) more long-term debt as the productivity process becomes more
persistent. Since both the demand and supply of long-term debt increase, the overall
use of long-term debt must increase. Figure 2.4 illustrates the increase use of long-
term debt for entrepreneurs with both low and high current productivities. The
green solid line presents the long-term debt policy when TFP is more persistent
(ρ  .9). The teal dotted broken line presents the long-term debt policy when TFP
is less persistent (ρ  .5). Comparing the two line, we see that entrepreneurs with
TFP below 1.36 choose to reduce long-term debt and entrepreneurs with TFP above
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1.36 choose to increase long-term debt as TFP becomes more persistent. Suppose
that the wealth share of the those entrepreneurs stay the same after the increase in
persistence, then there are must be more use of long-term debt when TFP becomes
more persistence. In reality, the wealth shares of entrepreneurs with high TFP will
increase compared to those with low TFP. Moreover, the equilibrium long-term debt
interest rate will change as well. Hence, I can only state the intuition for the increase
use of long-term debt without a formal proposition.
When the productivity shocks are more persistent, the entrepreneurs can predict
future productivities better from the current productivity. Therefore, the currently
productive entrepreneurs are willing to borrow more in long-term debt and the cur-
rently unproductive entrepreneurs are willing to lend more in long-term debt. As a
result, they are both better off when they are out of the market in the future.
2.5 Debt Maturity and TFP losses
2.5.1 Importance of long-term debt
From the model we see that the predictability of TFP affects debt maturity in the
economy. In particular, when TFP is more predictable, more long-term debt will
be used in the economy. As illustrated in Figure 2.4, the entrepreneurs with high z
increase long-term debt borrowing and the entrepreneurs with low z increase long-
term debt lending as the persistence parameter ρ increases from 0.5 to 0.9.
However, debt maturity also has impact on aggregate TFP. When TFP is persis-
tent, the currently more productive entrepreneurs are more likely to stay productive
next period. Hence, if the productive entrepreneurs borrowed long-term debt cur-
rently, there is a good chance that they will need the borrowed resources still next
period. Therefore, having long-term debt will alleviate capital misallocation when
the entrepreneurs are out of the market next period. Among all entrepreneurs that
are out of the market, the active entrepreneurs who produces are the productive ones
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and they have more resources. Hence, the average productivity for out of the market
entrepreneurs increases.
Moreover, when the TFP is more persistent, the more productive entrepreneurs
will accumulate more wealth and stay productive more often. Hence, the station-
ary distribution of the entrepreneurs will have a first order stochastic dominant im-
provement. That is more resources will be in the hands of the more productive
entrepreneurs. This point is illustrated in Figure 2.4, where more weights are shifted
to the more productive entrepreneurs in the wealth shares of “in-the-market” en-
trepreneurs after ρ increases from 0.5 to 0.9. In fact, as show in Figure 2.5, the
wealth shares for both in and out of the market entrepreneurs increase for the more
productive entrepreneurs. Both this direct improvement of the wealth shares and the
indirect reduction of misallocation for “out-of-market” contribute to a higher aggre-
gate TFP and growth rate of capital. Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 21. Aggregate (average) productivity increases as the idiosyncratic TFP
process becomes more persistent.
Moreover, the effect of long-term debt is bigger when TFP is more persistent.
To illustrate the point, I compare the average growth rate of capital of two groups
of entrepreneurs that are out of the market. One group comes into the period with
existing long-term debt optimally chosen in last period. The other comes into the
period with no long-term debt because it was out of the market in last period as well.
The growth rate of capital is the return from capital net of wage and interest. Table
2.2 shows that the average growth rate of capital of entrepreneurs without long-term
debt is 6.79% lower than that of entrepreneurs with long-term debt when TFP is
very persistent (ρ  .9). However, the average growth rate of capital of entrepreneurs
without long-term debt is only 3.66% lower than that of entrepreneurs with long-
term debt when TFP is less persistent (ρ  .5). Hence, long-term debt plays a more
important role when TFP is more persistent.
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2.5.2 Pro-cyclical Debt Maturity
As mentioned before, Bloom and others have documented a counter-cyclical uncer-
tainty in productivity. I argue that there is also a pro-cyclical persistence which
contributes to blurry future prospects during recessions. From a quarterly data of
Compustat from 1973 to 2012, I estimate the persistence parameter. Since TFP is
hard to measure with Compustat data due to limited information on wage expense, I
look at the persistence in sales. I divide the data into ten subperiod datasets according
to NBER recession dates. So, I have five expansion periods and five recession period.
Then for each period, I run an AR(1) regression on the log of sales for each firm.
Then I take an equal-weighted average over all the firms. From the results shown
in Table 2.1, we see that indeed sales are much more persistence during expansions
(the second row from Panel A) than during recessions (the first row from Panel A)
for all periods. In fact, on average sales is about three times more persistent during
expansions than during recessions. At the same time, debt maturity is longer during
expansions than during recessions. From Panel B of Table 2.1, the faction of debt
maturing in a year is consistently higher during expansions than during recessions,
with the exception of recession from January 1980 to November 1982. Also in Panel
C, the value weighted maturity of all debt recorded in the DealScan data is clearly
higher in during expansions than during recessions.
Hence, the empirical pattern seems to be consistent with the story that the pro-
cyclical debt maturity is caused by the pro-cyclical persistence in productivity. Next,
I examine the difference between the growth rates of capital for in and out of market
entrepreneurs. I investigate how the difference changes from expansion to recession
and how those differences change when the probability of being excluded from the
market rises.
Since expansions are associated with higher persistence and lower volatility, I set
the persistence parameter ρ to be .9 (.5) and standard deviation of error term σ to
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be .3775 (.75) for expansion (recession). As shown in Table 2.3, During recession,
there is a much larger reduction in the growth rate of capital from in the market to
out of the market. This is a direct result of the reduced use of long-term debt during
recessions. The growth rate of capital for “out-of-market” entrepreneurs in recession
is only about 1.05 compared to about 1.08 during expansion. Although the reduction
in growth rate is across the board higher in recession than that in expansion, during
expansion the reduction is more sensitive to the probability of being excluded from
the market. Basically, two things happen when the probability of out of the market
increases. First, since a larger fraction of the total resources will grow at a lower
“out-of-market” growth rate, the wage has to decrease so that both in the market
and out of market growth rates will increase. Second, among all entrepreneurs that
are out of the market, a larger fraction of them come into the period without long-term
debt. Hence, a larger fraction of them will grow at a lower “no long-term debt” rate
as illustrated in Table 2.2. Hence, the average growth rate for all “out-of-market”
entrepreneurs should decrease. During expansion the second effect dominates the
first since the difference between “with long-term debt” and “no long-term debt”
growth rate is much bigger than that during recession (as illustrated in Table 2.2q.
Hence, during expansion, the reduction in growth rate increases dramatically as the
probability of out of the market increases. Therefore, a financial crisis that suddenly
makes everyone difficult to borrow may have bigger impact on aggregate growth rate
during expansions.
2.6 Conclusion
I introduce a model that illustrates how counter-cyclical uncertainty and pro-cyclical
persistence in productivity lead to pro-cyclical aggregate debt maturity. In the model,
both short-term and long-term debt are vehicles through which the entrepreneurs
transfer resources from one to another. In each period, before production takes
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place, the more productivity entrepreneurs will borrow from the less productivity
ones. Hence, the resources will be put into more efficient use. However, when the
entrepreneurs are sometimes unable to conduct such transfer in future periods, they
arrange for long-term transfer so that the productive ones may have more resources
when they can’t borrow in the future. Hence, the amount of long-term debt used is
directly linked to how predictable the productivity process is. When TFP is highly
persistent, more long-term debt is used. Long-term debt plays an important role in
alleviating capital misallocation and preserving aggregate productivity and growth
rate of capital. Finally, a sudden increase in the probability of not being able to
borrow may have a greater impact on aggregate growth rate during expansion than
during recession.
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Figure 2.1: The Entrepreneur’s Problem (Timeline).
This figure presents the timeline when the entrepreneur is currently “in-the-market”
(s=1). The current aggregate state which include the entire distribution of the
entrepreneurs is summarized by X. Similarly, next period aggregate state is
summarized by X 1. In the next period, the entrepreneur can either be
“in-the-market” (s’=1) or “out-of-market” (s’=0). The idiosyncratic states are net
worth, a, existing long-term debt, b, and productivity, z. The entrepreneur
chooses, new levels of long-term debt, b, and short-term debt, d before production.
The entrepreneur chooses, consumption, c, and end period net worth a1. The
entrepreneur also repays interest and principle on current short-term debt, Rd, and
on pre-existing long-term debt, Rb1, and interest on new long-term debt, rb.
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 R௅ ൏ൌ൐ zୠ  
                                                                
                                                       b > 0, d+b‐ < 0 
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                                                                                        zത                                                                   
 
   Lend short                          b > 0, d+ b‐ < 0                                        
      Borrow long                                                               
                                                                                        zୠ                           b+d+b‐ = ‐ a 
                                                 b < 0, d+ b‐ < 0                                                 Net lender 
                                                                                                                                                             
  Long term lender                          
 
                                                    b < 0, d+ b‐ > 0 
 
R ൏ൌ൐ zത  
Figure 2.2: Spectrum of Entrepreneurs in the Market.
This figure summaries the optimal chooses by entrepreneurs across different current
productivity levels. As we move upwards, current productivity realization increases.
Entrepreneurs with productivity above z¯ are net borrowers. Entrepreneurs with
productivity below z¯ are net lenders. Entrepreneurs with productivity above zb are
long-term borrowers. Entrepreneurs with productivity below zb are long-term
lenders.
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of the Economy.
This figure illustrates how the economy evolves from one period to the next. The
function gtpa, φ

b , zq keeps track of the end of period t 1 net worth, long-term
debt, and new productivity of the entrepreneurs who were previously
“in-the-market”. The function htpa, 0, zq keeps track of the end of period t 1 net
worth, long-term debt, and new productivity of the entrepreneurs who were
previously “out-of-market”. In period t, a fraction p of the entrepreneurs goes
“out-of-market” and a fraction 1 p of the entrepreneurs goes “in-the-market”.
Prior to production, the currently “in-the-market” entrepreneurs are identified by
their net worth a and productivity z. The function g˜tpa, zq is the measure of those
entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the currently “out-of-market” entrepreneurs are
identified by their net worth a, productivity z and existing long-term debt, b. The
function h˜tpa, b
, zq is the measure of those entrepreneurs. At the end of period t,
the distributions gt 1pa
1, φb, z
1q and ht 1pa
1, 0, z1q are obtained from g˜tpa, zq and
h˜tpa, b
, zq after taking into account of all individual decisions in period t.
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Figure 2.4: Wealth Shares and Long-term Debt Policy.
This figure plots the “in-the-market” wealth shares ωpzq and the long-term debt
policy function φbpzq for two different levels of persistence and volatility of TFP.
The pair (ρH  .9, σL  .3775) represents economic expansions in which the TFP is
more predictable. The pair (ρL  .5, σH  .75) represents economic recessions in
which the TFP is less predictable. ρH (ρL) is used to indicate expansion (recession).
The green solid line is long-term debt policy in expansion. The blue broken line is
the corresponding “in-the-market” wealth shares at the steady state in expansion.
The teal dotted broken line is the long-term debt policy in recession. The red
dotted line is the corresponding “in-the-market” wealth shares in recession.
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Figure 2.5: Wealth Shares In and Out of Market.
This figure plots the “in-the-market” wealth shares ωpzq and “out-of-market” wealth
shares u0pzq for two different levels of persistence and volatility of TFP. The pair
(ρH  .9, σL  .3775) represents economic expansions in which the TFP is more
predictable. The pair (ρL  .5, σH  .75) represents economic recessions in which
the TFP is less predictable. ρH (ρL) is used to indicate expansion (recession). The
green solid line is “out-of-market” wealth shares in expansion. The blue broken line
is the corresponding “in-the-market” wealth shares at the steady state in expansion.
The teal dotted broken line is “out-of-market” wealth shares in recession. The red
dotted line is the corresponding “in-the-market” wealth shares in recession.
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Table 2.1: Persistence of Idiosyncratic Productivity.
This table presents the persistence of TFP and the average debt maturity for dif-
ferent subperiods. The persistence parameters shown in panel A are estimated
from an AR(1) regression of the natural log of sales from Compustat Quarterly
Files. For the regressions for recession periods (shown on the first line), I also
included one quarter before and after the NBER recession. The debt maturity
shown in panel B is measured as the fraction of debt in current liability out of
total debt. Total debt is the sum of debt in current liability and long-term debt.
the data are from Compustat Quarterly Files. The debt maturity shown in panel
C is measured in month. The data is from DealScan. The persistence parame-
ters are equal weighted averages of firm persistence parameters. The debt maturity
measures are value weighted averages, hence represent aggregate debt maturity.
Panel A : Subperiod Productivity Persistence
Nov73-Mar75 Jan80-Nov82 Jul90-Mar91 Mar01-Nov01 Dec07-Jun09
0.3411 0.2896 -0.0610 0.1607 0.2945
Apr75-Dec79 Dec82-Jun90 Apr91-Feb01 Dec01-Nov07 Jul09-Dec12
0.6665 0.5249 0.5835 0.5388 0.4052
Panel B : Subperiod Debt Maturity (Compustat)
Nov73-Mar75 Jan80-Nov82 Jul90-Mar91 Mar01-Nov01 Dec07-Jun09
0.669 0.697 0.629 0.627 0.681
Apr75-Dec79 Dec82-Jun90 Apr91-Feb01 Dec01-Nov07 Jul09-Dec12
0.722 0.654 0.643 0.670 0.693
Panel C : Subperiod Debt Maturity (DealScan)
Jul90-Mar91 Mar01-Nov01 Dec07-Jun09
52 32 47
Jul86-Jun90 Apr91-Feb01 Dec01-Nov07 Jul09-Dec12
57 45 49 53
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Table 2.2: Effects of Long-term Debt.
This table presents the steady state aggregate growth rates of capital for “out-
of-market” entrepreneurs with or without long-term debt under two types of eco-
nomic conditions. There are two types of “out-of-market” entrepreneurs. The
first type “With Long-term Debt” means the entrepreneurs can choose the opti-
mal long-term debt last period. The first type “Without Long-term Debt” means
the entrepreneurs cannot choose the optimal long-term debt last period. Hence,
they have zero long-term debt. The aggregate growth rate is the wealth weighted
average of individual growth rates. The reduction in growth is the difference be-
tween with and without long-term debt growth rate scaled by with long-term debt
growth rate. Expansions correspond to a setup with high persistence ρ  .9
and low volatility σ  .3775 of productivity. Recessions correspond to a setup
with low persistence ρ  .5 and high volatility σ  .75 of productivity.
Recessions Expansions
pρ  .5 σ  .75q pρ  .9 σ  .3775q
With Long-term Debt 1.0528 1.0875
No long-term Debt 1.0143 1.0137
Reduction in growth 3.66% 6.79%
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Table 2.3: Growth for In and Out of the Market.
This table presents the steady state aggregate growth rates of capital for “In-the-
market” and “out-of-market” entrepreneurs and steady state fraction of resources
in the hands of “out-of-market” entrepreneurs across different probability of “out-of-
market”. The first two rows show the aggregate growth rates for “In-the-market” and
“out-of-market” entrepreneurs. The aggregate growth rate is the wealth weighted av-
erage of individual growth rates. The reduction in growth is the difference between in
and out of market growth rates scaled by in the market growth rate. The resource out
of the market is the fraction of total resource that are in the hand of “out-of-market”
entrepreneurs in steady state. As we move from left to right, the probability of out
of the market increase from 0.05 to 0.4. Expansions correspond to a setup with high
persistence ρ  .9 and low volatility σ  .3775 of productivity. Recessions correspond
to a setup with low persistence ρ  .5 and high volatility σ  .75 of productivity.
p  0.05 p  0.1 p  0.2 p  0.4
Panel A: in recessions pρ  .5 σ  .75q
In the Market 1.0889 1.0911 1.0962 1.1103
Out of Market 1.0497 1.0494 1.0499 1.0520
Reduction in growth 3.60% 3.82% 4.22% 5.25%
Resource out of Market 4.83% 9.65% 19.32% 38.71%
Panel B: in expansions pρ  .9 σ  .3775q
In the Market 1.0870 1.0877 1.0899 1.1017
Out of Market 1.0861 1.0802 1.0752 1.0645
Reduction in growth 0.08% 0.69% 1.34% 3.38%
Resource out of Market 4.97% 9.95% 19.98% 39.56%
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Appendix A
Proofs
Appendix A: Value function properties
Proof of Proposition 1. Following Rampini and Viswanathan (2010), I prove the propo-
sition in five parts below. To simplify the notation, I use b and b instead of bL and
bL to represent current and next period long-term debt. Also, I will use pips
1q so that
pip0q  pi and pip1q  1 pi.
(i) Γpw, bL , z, sq is a convex set, given pw, b

L , z, sq, and (jointly) convex in w and b

given z and s.
Proof of (i). Suppose x, xˆ P Γpw, b, z, sq. For ψ P p0, 1q, let xψ  ψx p1ψqxˆ.
Then xψ P Γpw, b
, z, sq because equations p1.3q, p1.5q, p1.6q, and p1.7q are linear and
because Apz1qfpkq is concave in k.
Now let x P Γpw, b, z, sq and xˆ P Γpwˆ, bˆ, z, sq. For ψ P p0, 1q, let xψ  ψx  p1
ψqxˆ. Since Γpw, b, z, sq is convex given w, b, z, s and since equations p1.4q, p1.5q,
and p1.7q do not involve w or b, I only need to check equations p1.3q and p1.6q. Since
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both constraints are linear in x, b, and w , I have:
ψpw   bS   bq   p1 ψqpw   bS   bq ¥ ψpd  kq   p1 ψqpd  kq
ψb   p1 ψqbˆ ¥ ψb  p1 ψqbˆ, for s  0
Thus, xψ P Γpψw   p1  ψqwˆ, ψb
   p1  ψqbˆ, z, sq. Therefore, Γpw, b, z, sq is
jointly convex in w and b.
Lemma 2 Γpw, b, z, sq is monotone in w in the sense that w ¤ wˆ implies Γpw, b, z, sq
 Γpwˆ, b, z, sq and Γpw, b, z, sq is monotone in b in the sense that b ¤ bˆ implies
Γpw, b, z, sq  Γpw, bˆ, z, sq.
Proof of Lemma 2. Given b, z, and s, increasing w only relaxes constraint
p1.3q. So, any feasible choice under Γpw, b, z, sq is still feasible under Γpwˆ, b, z, sq.
Thus, if w ¤ wˆ, then Γpw, b, z, sq  Γpwˆ, b, z, sq.
Similarly, given w, z, and s, increasing b only relaxes constraint p1.6q. So, if
b ¤ bˆ, then Γpw, b, z, sq  Γpw, bˆ, z, sq.
Lemma 3 The operator T satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction
and has a unique fixed point V.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose gpw, b, z, sq ¥ fpw, b, z, sq, @pw, b, z, sq P <2  
< t0, 1u. Then, for any x P Γpw, b, z, sq,
pTgqpw, b, z, sq ¥ d  β
¸
s1
pips1q
»
gpwpz1q, b, z1, s1qdQz
¥ d  β
¸
s1
pips1q
»
fpwpz1q, b, z1, s1qdQz.
Thus,
pTgqpw, b, z, sq  max
xPΓpa,b,z,sq
d  β
¸
s1
pips1q
»
gpwpz1q, b, z1, s1qdQz
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¥ max
xPΓpw,bL ,z,sq
d  β
¸
s1
pips1q
»
fpwpz1q, b, z1, s1qdQz  pTfqpw, b
, z, sq
for all pw, b, z, sq P <2   < t0, 1u. Thus, T satisfies monotonicity.
Also,
T pf   aqpw, b, z, sq ¤ max
xPΓpw,b,z,sq
d  β
¸
s1
pips1q
»
pf   aqpwpz1q, b, z, sqdQz
 pTfqpw, b, z, sq   βa
Therefore, T satisfies discounting. Hence, T is a contraction and has a unique
fixed point V by the contraction mapping theorem.
Lemma 4 V is continuous, strictly increasing in w. V is continuous, increasing in
b. And V is jointly concave in w and b.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let xo P Γpw, b
, z, sq and xˆo P Γpwˆ, bˆ
, z, sq be the optimal
choices that attain pTfqpw, b, z, sq and pTfqpwˆ, bˆ, z, sq respectively.
I first prove the joint concavity of V in w, b, given z and s.
Suppose f is jointly concave in w, b. Then, for ψ P p0, 1q, let xo,ψ  ψxo p1ψqxˆo
and wψ  ψw   p1 ψqwˆ, b

ψ  ψb
   p1 ψqbˆ. I have
pTfqpwψ, b

ψ , z, sq ¥ do,ψ   β
¸
s1
pips1q
»
fpwo,ψpz
1q, bo,ψ, z
1, s1qdQz
¥ ψrdo   β
¸
s1
pips1q
»
fpwopz
1q, bo, z
1, s1qdQzs
  p1 ψqrdˆo   β
¸
s1
pips1q
»
fpwˆopz
1q, bˆo, z
1, s1qdQzs
 ψpTfqpw, b, z, sq   p1 ψqpTfqpwˆ, bˆ, z, sq.
The first inequality is by the fact that Γpw, b, z, sq is jointly convex in w and b.
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So, xo,ψ P Γpwψ, bψ, z, sq. The second inequality is by the fact f is assumed to be
jointly concave.
Thus, Tf is jointly concave in w and b. T maps jointly concave functions into
jointly concave functions. Therefore, V is jointly concave in w and b. Hence, the first
order conditions are also sufficient conditions; and V is also concave in w and concave
in b.
Suppose f is increasing in b and b ¤ bˆ.
pTfqpw, bˆ, z, sq  dˆo   β
¸
s1
pips1q
»
fpwpz1q, bˆo, z
1, s1qdQz
¥ d  β
¸
s1
pips1q
»
fpwpz1q, b, z1, s1qdQz
Hence,
pTfqpw, bˆ, z, sq ¥ max
xPΓpw,b,z,sq
d  β
¸
s1
pips1q
»
fpwpz1q, b, z1, s1qdQz  pTfqpw, b
, z, sq
So, Tf is increasing in b. T maps increasing functions into increasing functions.
Therefore, V is increasing in b.
Similar arguments using w and wˆ show that V is increasing in w. Plus, suppose
w   wˆ, then
pTfqpwˆ, b, z, sq ¥ pwˆwq do β
¸
s1
pips1q
»
fpwopz
1q, b, z1, s1qdQz ¡ pTfqpw, b
, z, sq
So, Tf is strictly increasing in w. T maps increasing functions into strictly in-
creasing functions. Therefore, V is strictly increasing in w.
Finally, since V is both increasing and concave in w and in b, V is continuous in
both w and b.
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Lemma 5 V pw, b, z, sq is strictly concave in w for w P inttw : dpw, b, z, sq  0u.
V pw, b, 1, 0q is strictly concave in w and b for tw, bu P intttw, bu : dpw, b, z, 0q 
0, b   1pL
pL
wu.
Proof of Lemma 5. First I show that suppose for @w, wˆ P inttw : dpw, b, z, sq 
0u and wˆ ¥ w, if the optimal choices is such that kˆo  ko, then I have for ψ P p0, 1q and
xo,ψ  ψxo p1ψqxˆo, V pwψ, b
, z, sq ¡ do,ψ β
°
s1 pips
1q
³
V pwo,ψpz
1q, bo,ψ, z
1, s1qdQz ¥
ψV pw, b, z, sq p1ψqV pwˆ, bˆ, z, sq. The strict inequality is due to the fact that con-
straint p1.4q is slack hence net worth levels wpz1q ¡ wo,ψpz
1q are feasible for all z1. The
second inequality is due to the concavity of V. For simplicity, I let pL  1R
1
L θp1δq
represents the minimal down payment as discussed in Section 6.
From the FOCs, we have that when w Ñ 0, Apz1qfkpkq   p1  δq ¡ RL, @z
1 P Z.
Hence, there exists a level of net worth w˜ s.t. @w   w˜, either the collateral constraint
is binding λ ¡ 0 or the financing constraint is bind γL ¡ 0. Then @w   wˆ   w˜ and
while λ ¡ 0, kˆo ¡ ko. Hence, V pw, b
, z, 0q with b ¡ 1pL
pL
w and V pw, b, z, 1q are
strictly concave in w for w   w˜. Also, for s  0, given some b, bˆ ¤ 1pL
pL
w˜, and
w, wˆ   w˜, such that tw, bu  twˆ, bˆu, it must be that ko ¡ kˆo because bˆo  bˆ
,
bo  b
, do  dˆo  0, bS,o  bˆS,o  0, and budget constraints p1.3q and p1.4q are always
binding. Thus, V is strictly jointly concave in w and b, @tw, bu P p0, w˜sr0, 1pL
pL
wq.
Now suppose w, wˆ ¥ w˜, wˆ ¡ w, and kˆo  ko. Then, bˆ   bˆS   b   bS by equa-
tion p1.3q. Hence, either wˆpz1q ¡ wpz1q for all z1 or bˆ ¡ b. Then for some low z1,
wˆpz1q, wpz1q   w˜, and for those z1 states, V pwo,ψpz
1q, bo,ψ, z
1, 0q ¡ ψV pwopz
1q, bo, z, 0q 
p1ψqV pwˆopz
1q, bˆo, z, 0q. Thus, V pwψ, b
, z, sq ¡ ψV pw, b, z, sq p1ψqV pwˆ, bˆ, z, sq,
and V is also strictly concave for w˜   w   wˆ. Next, let wˆ be the new w˜, and applying
the same logic, I have that for all w P inttw : dpw, b, z, sq  0u, V is strictly concave
in w.
As asserted in Result 3, when s  0, and w ¡ pL
1pL
b, then bo  b
. Hence,
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for tw, bu, twˆ, bˆu P p0, ws  r0, 1pL
pL
wq and tw, bu  twˆ, bˆu, then either ko  kˆo
or wopz
1q  wˆopz
1q @z1 because equations p1.3q and p1.4q hold with equalities and
since bo  b
, bˆo  bˆ
, do  dˆo  0, and RL ¡ RS. If the later is true, then
Dwopz
1q  wˆopz
1q, and wopz
1q, wˆopz
1q P inttw : dpw, b, z, sq  0u for some z1. Then a
convex combination can strictly increase V pwpz1q, b, z1, s1q for those z1. Therefore, V
is strictly (jointly) concave in w and b, @ tw, bu P p0, ws  r0, 1pL
pL
wq and where
do  0.
Lemma 6 Since the debts are non-state contingent and collateralized, if k ¡ 0, then
wpz1q ¡ 0 @z1 P Z. More formally, from equation p1.4q and constraint p1.5q, we have:
wpz1q ¥ Apz1qfpkq   p1 δqp1 θqk ¡ 0 @z1 P Z.
Now to show that k ¡ 0, note that k Ñ 0, Apz1qfkpkq Ñ 8 @z
1 by Assumptions 1
and 2. Thus, for k sufficiently small, Apz1qfkpkq   p1  δq ¡ RL ¡ RS @z
1 P Z. Then
from equations p1.9q and p1.11q, I obtain that when s  1, λ ¡ 0. Similar for s  0,
for any given bL if w is sufficiently low, constraint p1.6q will not bind and λ ¡ 0.
From constraint p1.3q, w   bS   bL ¥ k. Thus, for some w ¡ 0, constraint p1.3q will
bind only if k ¡ 0. Therefore starting will some w ¡ 0, all subsequent wptz, sutq and
kptz, sutq are positive.
Appendix B: Policy Functions
Proof of Proposition 2. Part (i): From equation 1.8, Vwpw, b
, z, sq  µpw, b, z, sq ¥
1. Since V is concave in w (Lemma 4), µpw, b, z, sq is decreasing in w. If dpwˆ, b, z, sq
¡ 0, then µpwˆ, b, z, sq  1 and µpw, b, z, sq  1 for all w ¥ wˆ. Let w¯pb, z, sq 
inftw : dpw, b, z, sq ¡ 0u.
Part (ii): Suppose w ¡ wˆ ¥ w¯pb, z, sq and let xˆo attain V pwˆ, b
, z, sq.
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V pw, b, z, sq  V pwˆ, b, z, sq  
³w
wˆ
dV , since V1pw, b
, z, sq  1 for any w ¥
w¯pb, z, sq. Hence xo  rw  w¯   dˆo, kˆo, wˆopz
1q, bˆos attains V pw, b
, z, sq.
Suppose xˆo, x˜o both attain V pwˆ, b
, z, sq, and kˆo  k˜o. Then by the fact that
Γpw, b, z, sq is a convex set and the fact that fpkq is strictly concave,
Afpko,ψq   p1 δqko,ψ ¡ ψrAfpkˆoq   p1 δqkˆos   p1 ψqrAfpk˜oq   p1 δqk˜os
where ko,ψ  ψkˆo   p1  ψqk˜o. Thus, there exists wo ¡ wo,ψ and its corresponding
xo P Γpwˆ, b
, z, sq that give a higher V , a contradiction. So, kopw, b
, z, sq is unique
for all w, b, z, s.
For w ¥ wˆ ¥ w¯pb, z, sq, let xˆo attain V pwˆ, b
, z, sq and xo attain V pw, b
, z, sq.
Suppose kˆo  ko. Then by concavity of Γpw, b
, z, sq in w [Lemma 1] and simi-
lar arguments as above, there exists a feasible choice such that V pwψ, b
, z, sq ¡
ψV pw, b, z, sq  p1ψqV pwˆ, b, z, sq, contradicting the fact that V is linear in w for
w ¥ w¯pb, z, sq. Hence, kopw, b
, z, sq  k¯opb
, z, sq for all w ¥ w¯pb, z, sq.
From above argument, I know that for w ¥ w¯, the firm can always choose the
same optimal choices k¯, b¯, and w¯.
Part (iii): Now, I will prove the uniqueness of optimal new debt level, bo, bS,o, end
period worth net, wopz
1q, and dividend, do.
For any optimal policy xo, if wopz
1q ¥ w¯pb, z1, 0q for all z1, then by Proposition 4,
wopz
1q ¥ w¯pbo, z
1, s1q and µpwˆpz1q, bˆ, z1, s1q  1 for all z1. In this case, from the optimal-
ity conditions, I know that either λ ¡ 0 or γs ¡ 0. If λ ¡ 0, then γlpwpz
1q, bl, z
1, 0q ¡ 0
for some future state pz1, 0q. Since both conditions (1.4) and (1.5) hold as equality,
wopz
1q are uniquely determined by ko. Since γlpwpz
1q, b, z1, 0q is strictly decreasing in
b, bo is also unique. Then, bS,o and do are unique by equations (1.5) and (1.3). On
the other hand, if γs ¡ 0, λ  0 then γl ¡ 0 since µ ¥ 1 ¡ βRL and by optimality
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condition (1.11). Thus, bS,o  0 and bo  b
, so bS,o, bo are unique. Hence, wpz
1q and
do are unique by equations (1.4) and (1.3).
Now Suppose x and xˆ both obtain the optimal value and wpz1q   w¯pb, z1, 0q and
wˆpz1q   w¯pbˆ, z1, 0q for some state pz1, 0q. I denote such state by z˜. Since equations
(1.4) hold for all z1, if wpz1q  wˆpz1q for some state z1, then wpz1q  wˆpz1q for all state
z1 and vice versa. Suppose either wpz1q  wˆpz1q for some z1 or b  bˆ, then either
wpz˜q  wˆpz˜q or b  bˆ. By Proposition 1, the region tpw1, bq : dpw1, bq  0u is convex
and the value function V pw1, bq is strictly concave in that region. Hence, a convex
combination between twpz˜q , bu and twˆpz˜q, bˆu is feasible and attains a strictly higher
value, a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that b  bˆ and wpz1q  wˆpz1q for all state
z1. Thus, bo and wopz
1q are unique if wopz
1q   w¯pbo, z
1, 0q for some pz1, 0q. Finally, do
and bS,o are also unique by equations (1.4) and (1.3).
Proof of Proposition 4. Figure 1.7 shows the value functions for two different levels
of long-term debt. I use the figure to illustrate the relations between the points
mentioned in the following proof.
By Proposition 1, for two levels of long-term debt, bL ¡ b˜

L , both V pw, b

Lq and
V pw, b˜Lq are increasing and concave in w. Also, V pw, b

Lq ¥ V pw, b˜

Lq at any point
w with strictly inequality when financing constraint is binding at w, bL . Further,
by part (i) of Proposition 2, V pw, bLq and V pw, b˜

Lq eventually stay parallel since
µpw, bLq  µpw, b˜

Lq  1 for w ¥ maxtw¯pb˜

L , z, 0q, w¯pb

L , z, 0qu. Finally, as w Ñ 0,
both V pw, bLq and V pw, b˜

Lq Ñ 0. Hence, µpw, b

Lq falls to 1 before µpw, b˜

Lq does.
That is, w¯pb˜L , z, 0q ¡ w¯pb

L , z, 0q. Moreover, since V pw, b˜

Lq is strictly concave before
w¯pb˜L , z, 0q, D w˜pb˜

L , b

Lq s.t. µpw, b˜

Lq ¡ µpw, b

Lq for all w P pw˜pb˜

L , b

Lq, w¯pb˜

L , z, 0qq.
Appendix C: 2-Period Model Formulation, FOC, and SOC
Proof of Lemma 7. Here I first solve the problem backward starting from time 1.
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At time 1, when s  1, the firm is solving the following problem:
max
d1,k2,bL2 ,b2,w2pA2q
d1   βE1w2pA2q,
w1   b2   b
L
2 ¥ d1   k2,
A2k2   p1 δqk2 Rb2 RLb
L
2 ¥ w2pA2q
θp1 δqk2 ¥ Rb2  RLb
L
2 ,
d1 ¥ 0, b
L
2 ¥ 0, b2 ¥ 0.
With linear production function under Assumption 3, the solution is: d1  0,
k2 
w1
q
, b2  p
1
q
 1qw1, b
L
2  0, w2pA2q 
Ret2
q
w1.
At time 1, when s  0, the firm is solving the following problem:
max
d1,k2,bL2 ,b2,w2pA2q
d1   βE1w2pA2q,
w1   b2   b
L
2 ¥ d1   k2,
A2k2   p1 δqk2 Rb2 RLb
L
2 ¥ w2pA2q
θp1 δqk2 ¥ Rb2  RLb
L
2 ,
bL1 ¥ b
L
2 ,
0 ¥ b2,
d1 ¥ 0, b
L
2 ¥ 0, b2 ¥ 0
As in the first case, the firm always wants to invest all in capital and payout
nothing at time 1.
If bL1 ¥ p
1
qL
 1qw1, then the firm is constrained by w1, hence d1  0, k2 
w1
qL
,
b2  0, b
L
2  p
1
qL
 1qw1, w2pA2q 
Ret2
qL
w1.
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If bL1   p
1
qL
 1qw1, then the firm is constrained by b
L
1 , hence d1  0, k2  w1  b
L
1 ,
bL2  b
L
1 , b2  0, w2pA2q  ˆRet2pw1   b
L
1 q RLb
L
1 .
Assuming a continuum of productivity states, and let gpA1q and g˜pA2|A1q be the
marginal density of A1 and the conditional density of A2 given A1, at time 0, the
problem becomes:
max
d0,k1,b1,bL1 ,w1pA1q
d0   β
2
"
p1 piq
» AH
AL
» AH
AL
RetpA2q
p
w1pA1qg˜pA2|A1qgpA1qdA2dA1
  pi
» A
AL
» AH
AL
RetpA2q
pL
w1pA1qg˜pA2|A1qgpA1qdA2dA1
  pi
» AH
A
» AH
AL
RˆetpA2qw1pA1qg˜pA2|A1qgpA1qdA2dA1
  pi
» AH
A
» AH
AL
rRˆetpA2q RLsg˜pA2|A1qb
L
1 gpA1qdA2dA1
*
(A.1)
Subject to the budget constraints
w0   b1   b
L
1  k1 ¥ d0,
A1k1   p1 δqk1 RLb
L
1 Rb1 ¥ w1pA1q,
the collateral constraint
θp1 δqk1 ¥ RLb
L
1  Rb1,
the non-negativity constraints
b1 ¥ 0, b
L
1 ¥ 0, d0 ¥ 0, k1 ¥ 0, w1pA1q ¥ 0,
and where
A 
"
A1 : w1pA1q 
bL1 pL
1 pL
*
.
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Each line in the big curly bracket of equation A.1 represents a payoff for one of
the three sets of states the firm may end up in at time 1. The first line is the payoff
if the firm has external financing at time 1 (s  1). The second line is the payoff if
the firm does not have external financing and does not have sufficient net worth to
keep all existing long-term debt at time 1 (s  0, w1pA1q  
bL1 pL
1pL
). The last line is
the payoff if the firm does not have external financing but has sufficient net worth at
time 1 (s  0, w1pA1q ¥
bL1 pL
1pL
).
I consider the case in which the productivity shocks are profitable enough such
that the firm will investment all in capital. Hence, the firm pays no dividends, d0  0.
Plus, the collateral constraint always binds.
Let α be the proportion of net worth that is used to lever through long-term debt.
More specifically, α  pL
p1pLq
bL1
w0
. The interpretation is that if the firm uses αw0 as
the minimal downpayment to borrow with long-term debt, it will be able to raise
bL1 
p1pLq
pL
α w0.
Now the problem can be reformulated as follow: (since the whole problem is linear
in w0, I can divide it out and focus only on the proportional decision)
V pαq  max
α
p1 piq
» AH
AL
» AH
AL
RetpA2q
p
w1pA1qg˜pA2|A1qgpA1qdA2dA1
  pi
» A
AL
» AH
AL
RetpA2q
pL
w1pA1, αqg˜pA2|A1qgpA1qdA2dA1
  pi
» AH
A
» AH
AL
RˆetpA2qw1pA1, αqg˜pA2|A1qgpA1qdA2dA1
  pi
» AH
A
» AH
AL
rRˆetpA2q RLsg˜pA2|A1qb
L
1 pαqgpA1qdA2dA1
where
w1pA1, αq  Ret1pA1qLev w0 (A.2)
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Ret1pA1q  A1   p1 δqp1 θq (A.3)
Lev  r
α
pL
 
1 α
p
s (A.4)
bL1 
p1 pLq
pL
α w0 (A.5)
A 
α
Lev
 p1 δqp1 θq (A.6)
p  1R1θp1 δq, pL  1R
1
L θp1 δq. (A.7)
The first order condition is given by:
"
p1 piq
» AH
AL
» AH
AL
"
RetpA2q
p
g˜pA2|A1qRet1pA1qgpA1q
*
dA2dA1
  pi
» A
AL
» AH
AL
"
RetpA2q
pL
g˜pA2|A1qRet1pA1qgpA1q
*
dA2dA1
  pi
» AH
A
» AH
AL
"
RˆetpA2qg˜pA2|A1qRet1pA1qgpA1q
*
dA2dA1
*
ppL  pq
pLp
 pi
1 pL
pL
» AH
A
» AH
AL
rRˆetpA2q RLsg˜pA2|A1qgpA1qdA2dA1
Notice that the terms involving derivatives of A with respect to α cancel out
because at state A the firm is indifferent between being constrained by net worth or
being constrained by existing long-term debt. That is:
bL1 pαq
» AH
AL
rRˆetpA2q RLsg˜pA2|AqgpAqdA2
 
"» AH
AL
"
RetpA2q
pL
g˜pA2|AqRet1pAqgpAq
*
dA2

» AH
AL
"
RˆetpA2qg˜pA2|AqRet1pAqgpAq
*
dA2
*
Levpαq  0 @α
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The second order derivative is:
B2V pαq
Bα2
 pi
1 pL
pL
» AH
AL
rRˆetpA2q RLsg˜pA2|AqgpAqdA2

"
pi
» AH
AL
"
RetpA2q
pL
g˜pA2|AqRet1pAqgpAq
*
dA2
 pi
» AH
AL
"
RˆetpA2qg˜pA2|AqRet1pAqgpAq
*
dA2
*
ppL  pq
pLp
Which have the same sign as:

1 pL
pL
» AH
AL
rRˆetpA2q RLsg˜pA2|AqdA2 
"» AH
AL
"
RetpA2q
pL
g˜pA2|AqRet1pAq
*
dA2

» AH
AL
"
RˆetpA2qg˜pA2|AqRet1pAq
*
dA2
*
ppL  pq
pLp

» AH
AL
"
ˆrRetpA2q 
RetpA2q
pL
sRet1pAq
ppL  pq
pLp
 rRˆetpA2q RLs
1 pL
pL
*
g˜pA2|AqdA2
 
» AH
AL
"
r
RetpA2q
pL
 RˆetpA2qsRet1pAq
1
pL
*
g˜pA2|Aq dA2   0
Hence, B
2V pαq
Bα2
  0 @α. Therefore, there is a unique α for the problem.
Appendix D: 2-Period Model comparative statics
Proof of proposition 19. Now suppose that A2  ρA1 . The density for A1 is gpA1q.
The density for  is fpq which is independent of A1. Hence, the FOC is:
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"
p1 piq
» AH
AL
» "
RetpρA1   q
p
fpqRetpA1qgpA1q
*
ddA1
  pi
» A
AL
» "
RetpρA1   q
pL
fpqRetpA1qgpA1q
*
ddA1
  pi
» AH
A
» "
RˆetpρA1   qfpqRetpA1qgpA1q
*
ddA1
*
ppL  pq
pLp
 pi
1 pL
pL
» AH
A
»
rRˆetpρA1   q RLsfpqgpA1qddA1
or equivalently,
"
p1 piq
» AH
AL
RetpρA1q
p
RetpA1qgpA1q dA1   pi
» A
AL
RetpρA1q
pL
RetpA1qgpA1qdA1
  pi
» AH
A
RˆetpρA1qRetpA1qgpA1qdA1
*
ppL  pq
pLp
 pi
1 pL
pL
» AH
A
rRˆetpρA1q RLsgpA1qdA1
And B
2V pαq
BαBρ
becomes:

"
p1 piq
» AH
AL
A1
p
RetpA1qgpA1qdA1   pi
» A
AL
A1
pL
RetpA1qgpA1qdA1
  pi
» AH
A
A1RetpA1qgpA1q dA1
*
ppL  pq
pLp
  pi
1 pL
pL
» AH
A
A1gpA1qdA1
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From the FOC, we have that
B2V pαq
BαBρ
ρ
"
p1 piq
» AH
AL
p1 δqp1 θq
p
RetpA1qgpA1qdA1
  pi
» A
AL
p1 δqp1 θq
pL
RetpA1qgpA1qdA1
  pi
» AH
A
p1 δqRetpA1qgpA1q dA1
*
ppL  pq
pLp
  pi
1 pL
pL
rp1 δq RLs
» AH
A
gpA1qdA1  0
Since p1  δq  RL   0 and the term in curly bracket is positive,
B2V pαq
BαBρ
¡ 0.
Therefore, by the SOC and implicit function theorem, Bα
Bρ
¡ 0.
Proof of proposition 10. Suppose for now the shocks are independent. Let ˆRet2 
ErRˆetpA2qs, Ret2  ErRetpA2qs, and Ret1  ErRetpA1qs
The now FOC now becomes:

"
p1 piq
Ret2
q
Ret1   pi
Ret2
qL
» A
AL
RetpA1qgpA1qdA1
  pi ˆRet2
» AH
A
RetpA1qgpA1qdA1
*
ppL  pq
pLp
  PrpA1 ¡ Aqpir ˆRet2 RLs
1 qL
qL
 0
And we have:
B2V pαq
BαBpEA2q
 
"
p1 piq
Ret1
q
 
pi
qL
» A
AL
RetpA1qgpA1qdA1
  pi
» AH
A
RetpA1qgpA1qdA1
*
ppL  pq
pLp
  PrpA1 ¡ Aqpi
1 qL
qL
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By manipulating the term, we obtain the following equation:

"
p1 piq
Ret1
q
rRet2  ˆRet2  RLs  
pi
qL
rRet2  ˆRet2  RLs
» A
AL
RetpA1qgpA1qdA1
  piRL
» AH
A
RetpA1qgpA1qdA1
*
ppL  pq
pLp
 
B2V pAq
BABpE1A2q
r ˆRet2 RLs 
BV pαq
Bα
 0
Since rRet2 ˆRet2 RLs ¡ 0, the term in the curly bracket is positive. Also, since
ˆRet2 RL ¡ 0, we have
B2V pαq
BαBpEA2q
¡ 0. Finally, by the second order condition and the
implicit function theorem, we have: Bα
BpEA2q
¡ 0.
Proof of proposition 11. Now suppose instead that A1    is the productivity at time
1, and still gpA1q is the marginal pdf for A1 and g˜pA2|A1q is the conditional pdf for
A2 given A1.
We have that A  α
Lev
 p1  δqp1  θq  , and the return for time 1 is now
RetpA1q  A1     p1 δqp1 θq. Hence, the now FOC is:
"
p1 piq
» AH
AL
» AH
AL
"
RetpA2q
p
g˜pA2|A1qRet1pA1   qgpA1q
*
dA2dA1
  pi
» A
AL
» AH
AL
"
RetpA2q
pL
g˜pA2|A1qRet1pA1   qgpA1q
*
dA2dA1
  pi
» AH
A
» AH
AL
"
RˆetpA2qg˜pA2|A1qRet1pA1   qgpA1q
*
dA2dA1
*
ppL  pq
pLp
 pi
1 pL
pL
» AH
A
» AH
AL
rRˆetpA2q RLsg˜pA2|A1qgpA1qdA2dA1
where A  α
Lev
 p1 δqp1 θq  . So B
2V pαq
BαB
becomes:
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pi"
r
» AH
AL
RetpA2q
pL
g˜pA2|AqRet1pA  qgpAqdA2

» AH
AL
RˆetpA2qg˜pA2|AqRet1pA  qgpAq dA2s
ppL  pq
pLp

1 pL
pL
» AH
AL
rRˆetpA2q RLsg˜pA2|AqgpAqdA2
*

"
p1 piq
» AH
AL
» AH
AL
RetpA2q
p
g˜pA2|A1qgpA1qdA2dA1
  pi
» A
AL
» AH
AL
RetpA2q
pL
g˜pA2|A1qgpA1q dA2dA1
  pi
» AH
A
» AH
AL
RˆetpA2qg˜pA2|A1qgpA1q dA2dA1
*
ppL  pq
pLp
The three terms together in the first curly bracket are the increase in marginal
benefit of long-term debt due to the increase in time 1 productivity. The three terms
together in the second curly bracket are the increase in marginal cost of long-term
debt due to the increase in time 1 productivity. As long as pi is small, the sum in the
second bracket dominates that in the first bracket. Hence, for pi small, B
2V pαq
BαB
  0.
Thus by implicit function theorem and SOC, Bα
B
  0.
Proof of proposition 12. Now suppose that the interest rates for short-term and long-
term debt are λR and λRL where λ is a scalar which represents a proportional increase
or decrease in the interest rates. pL  1pλRLq
1θp1δq and p  1pλRq1θp1δq.
Then the FOC is:
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"
p1 piq
» AH
AL
» AH
AL
"
RetpA2q
p
g˜pA2|A1qRet1pA1qgpA1q
*
dA2dA1
  pi
» A
AL
» AH
AL
"
RetpA2q
pL
g˜pA2|A1qRet1pA1qgpA1q
*
dA2dA1
  pi
» AH
A
» AH
AL
"
RˆetpA2qg˜pA2|A1qRet1pA1qgpA1q
*
dA2dA1
*
ppL  pq
pLp
 pi
1 pL
pL
» AH
A
» AH
AL
rRˆetpA2q  λRLsg˜pA2|A1qgpA1qdA2dA1
For convenience, let’s denote the sum of the three terms in the first curly brackets
by ErRet2 Ret1;As. Also, let’s define:
ErRetpA2q;A1   As 
³A
AL
³AH
AL
"
RetpA2qg˜pA2|A1qRet1pA1qgpA1q
*
dA2dA1,
ErRetpA2qs 
³A
AL
³AH
AL
"
RetpA2qg˜pA2|A1qRet1pA1qgpA1q
*
dA2dA1,
and ErRˆetpA2q RL;A1 ¡ As 
³AH
A
³AH
AL
rRˆetpA2q  λRLsg˜pA2|A1qgpA1qdA2dA1.
Now take the derivative of V pαq
Bα
with respect to λ, we obtain:
B2V pαq
BαBλ
 ErRet2 Ret1;Asr
1
p2
θp1 δq
pλ2Rq

1
p2L
θp1 δq
pλ2RLq
s

"
p1 piq
p2
θp1 δq
pλ2Rq
ErRetpA2qs  
pi
p2L
θp1 δq
pλ2RLq
ErRetpA2q;A1   As
*
pp pLq
pLp
 pi
1 pL
pL
PrrA1 ¡ AsRL 
pi
p2L
θp1 δq
pλ2RLq
ErRˆetpA2q RL;A1 ¡ As
Now evaluate the above derivative at λ  1,
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ErRet2 Ret1;Asr
1
p2
θp1 δq
R

1
p2L
θp1 δq
RL
s

"
p1 piq
p2
θp1 δq
R
ErRetpA2qs  
pi
p2L
θp1 δq
RL
ErRetpA2q;A1   As
*
pp pLq
pLp
 pi
1 pL
pL
PrrA1 ¡ AsRL 
pi
p2L
θp1 δq
RL
ErRˆetpA2q RL;A1 ¡ As
  ErRet2 Ret1;Asp
1
p

1
pL
qp
1
p
 
1
pL
q
θp1 δq
RL
 pip
1
pL
 1qp
1
p
 
1
pL
q
θp1 δq
RL
ErRˆetpA2q RL;A1 ¡ As  pi
1 pL
pL
PrrA1 ¡ AsRL

"
p1 piq
p2
θp1 δq
R
ErRetpA2qs  
pi
p2L
θp1 δq
RL
ErRetpA2q;A1   As
*
pp pLq
pLp
 
"
p1 piq
p
ErRetpA2qs  
pi
pL
ErRetpA2q;A1   As
*
p
1
p

1
pL
q
θp1 δq
Rp
 pi
1 pL
pL
PrrA1 ¡ AsRL
Hence, if θp1δq
Rp
is small or if pi is big, then B
2V pαq
BαBλ
  0. Therefore, by implicit
function theorem and SOC, Bα
Bλ
  0. Here θp1δq
R
is the proportion per each unit of
capital that can be borrowed using short-term debt. 1
p
is the leverage from short-term
financing. Hence, when the firm is constrained (i.e. when θp1δq
Rp
is small), it uses even
more short-term debt when it becomes more constrained (i.e. when λ increases) .
Note: When θp1δq
R
is low, 1
p
is also low. So, the first inequality is due to the fact that
p 1
pL
 1qp1
p
  1
pL
q  1
p2L
  r 1
pL
1
p
 p1
p
  1
pL
qs which is well below 1
p2L
when 1
p
and 1
pL
are
low (i.g. when 1
p
  2). From the first order condition, ErRet2  Ret1;Asp
1
p
 1
pL
q 
pip 1
pL
 1qErRˆetpA2q  RL;A1 ¡ As  0. Hence, the second inequality is due to the
first order condition and the fact that 1
Rp
¡ 1
RLpL
.
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Appendix E: Resource Allocation and Debt Maturity
First I prove the following lemma that will be used in proofs later on.
Lemma 22. Suppose that
³8
0
fpxq  0, fpxq ¤ 0 for x ¤ x0 and fpxq ¡ 0 for x ¡ x0.
Let gpxq ¥ 0 be a monotonic function defined on r0,8q. Then
³8
0
fpxqgpxq ¥ 0, if
gpxq is increasing, and
³8
0
fpxqgpxq ¤ 0, if gpxq is decreasing. The strict inequality
holds if gpxq is strictly increasing or decreasing.
Proof. I prove the case when gpxq is increasing. The same proof applies if gpxq
is decreasing.
» 8
0
fpxqgpxqdx 
» x0
0
fpxqgpxqdx 
» 8
x0
fpxqgpxqdx
¥
» x0
0
fpxqgpx0qdx 
» 8
x0
fpxqgpx0qdx
 gpx0q
» 8
0
fpxqdx  0.
The inequality holds because fpxq ¤ 0 for x ¤ x0, fpxq ¡ 0 for x ¡ x0, and
because gpxq ¤ gpx0q for all x ¤ x0, gpx0q ¤ gpxq for all x0 ¤ x. The inequality
becomes strict if gpxq   gpx0q for all x   x0, gpx0q   gpxq for all x0   x.
Using the optimality conditions and plug in the expression for c and c1 for each
financial state s I have the following equations for the unconstraint problem (when
0 ¤ a1   b is not binding)
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1Apz, 1qa a1
 β
» 8
0

pApz1, 0q
Apz, 0qpa1   bq RLb a2
 
p1 pqApz1, 1q
Apz1, 1qa1  a2

ψpz1|zqdz1, s  1,
1
Apz, 0qpa  bq RLb  a1
 β
» 8
0

pApz1, 0q
Apz, 0qpa1   bq RLb a2
 
p1 pqApz1, 1q
Apz1, 1qa1  a2

ψpz1|z, σ1qdz1, s  0,
» 8
0
Apz1, 0q RL
Apz, 0qpa1   bq RLb a2
ψpz1|zqdz1  0, for s  1.
where the returns on saving for states s  1, 2 as Apz, 0q  zpi   1  δ and
Apz, 1q  λmaxtzpi  r  δ, 0u  R respectively.
Suppose that all optimal decisions are linear in wealth I write the choice variables
as:
c  p1 φ1aqApz, 1qa b  φbpzqApz, 1qa a
1  φ1aApz, 1qa for s  1
c  p1φ0aqtApz, 0qpa b
qRLb
u a1  φ0atApz, 0qpa b
qRLb
u for s  0
Now I prove that the current period maximization problem is concave in
φ1a, φ
0
a, and φb.
Proof:
First note that V pa1, b, z1, sq is concave in a1 and b. Since φ1a, φ
0
a, and φb are
linearly related to a1 and b,V pa1, b, z1, sq is also concave in φ1a, φ
0
a, and φb. Moreover, the
current utility function logpwealtha1q is concave in a1. Along with linear constraints,
I conclude that the objective function is concave in φ1a, φ
0
a, and φb. Since I have proved
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that the current objective function is concave in φ1a, φ
0
a, and φb, I can find the solution
by the following procedure.
In first step, I guess and verify the solution for the unconstrained problem. Then
I prove monotonicity of the policy function φbpzq over RL and z. Finally, I derive
conditions under which constraint p2.3q is binding and characterize the solution for
the general case.
The solution for the unconstrained problem is determined by the following neces-
sary and sufficient optimality conditions:
1
1 φ0apzq
 β
» 8
0
p
p
φ0apzqp1 φ
0
apz
1qq
 
1 p
φ0apzqp1 φ
1
apz
1qq
qψpz1|zqdz1 (A.8)
1
1 φ1apzq
 β
» 8
0
p
ppz1pi   1 δq
rpφ1apzq   φbpzqqpz
1pi   1 δq RLφbpzqsp1 φ0apz
1qq
(A.9)
 
1 p
φ1apzqp1 φ
1
apz
1qq
qψpz1|zqdz1 (A.10)
» 8
0
z1pi   1 δ RL
rpφ1apzq   φbpzqqpz
1pi   1 δq RLφbpzqsp1 φ0apz
1qq
ψpz1|zqdz1  0. (A.11)
Suppose φ0apzq  φ
1
apzq  β and φbpzq ¡ β after simplification, equations pA.9q
and pA.11q become:
1
β

1
β   φbpzq
 
φbpzq
β   φbpzq
» 8
0
RLψpz
1|zq
rpβ   φbpzqqpz1pi   1 δq RLφbpzqs
dz1.
1
β

» 8
0
RLψpz
1|zq
rpβ   φbpzqqpz1pi   1 δq RLφbpzqs
dz1.
105
which can both be satisfied if φbpzq is the solution to φbpzq ¡ β and
1
β
³8
0
RLψpz
1|zq
rpβ φbpzqqpz1pi 1δqRLφbpzqs
dz1.
Hence, a solution to the system of equations is φ0apzq  φ
1
apzq  β, and φbpzq is
defined by:
³8
0
RLψpz
1|zq
pβ φbqpz1pi 1δqRLφb
dz1  1
β
and φbpzq ¡ β.
Now I prove that φbpzq is decreasing in R for any z. That is for φb ¡ β,
Bφb
BRL
  0. Proof:
By implicit function theorem, I have:
Bφb
BRL

³8
0
pβ φbqpz
1pi 1δqψpz1q
rpβ φbqpz1pi 1δqRφbs2
dz1³8
0
Rrz1pi 1δRsψpz1q
rpβ φbqpz1pi 1δqRφbs2
dz1
.
First, the numerator is always positive for φb ¥ β.
Now notice that
³8
0
ψpz1qrz1pi 1δRLs
rpβ φbqpz1pi 1δqRLφbs
dz1  0 by equation pA.11q from the first
order conditions. Plus, 1
rpβ φbqpz1pi 1δqRLφbs
is decreasing in z1 for φb ¡ β. Thus,
by lemma 22 I have
³8
0
ψpz1qrz1pi 1δRLs
rpβ φbqpz1pi 1δqRLφbs2
dz1   0, for φb ¡ β. Therefore,
Bφb
BRL
  0
for φb ¡ β.
Proof for 1
rpβ φbqpz1pi 1δqRLφbs
is decreasing in z1 for φb ¡ β.
B 1
rpβ φbqpz1pi 1δqRLφbs
Bz1

pβ   φbqpi
rpβ   φbqpz1pi   1 δq RLφbs2
  0 for φb ¡ β.
Now I prove that φbpzq is increasing in z if ψpz
1|z   εq F.O.S.D. ψpz1|zq (or z
is positively autocorrelated).
Proof of Bφb
Bz
  0 for φb ¡ β:
Since φ1a is independent of z, I obtain the following by differentiating both sides
of equation pA.11q with respect to z:
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» 8
0
p
z1pi   1  δ RL
rpβ   φbpzqqpz1pi   1  δq RLφbpzqs
q
Bψpz1|zq
Bz
dz1
 φ˜bpzq
» 8
0
p
pz1pi   1  δ RLq
rpβ   φbpzqqpz1pi   1  δq RLφbpzqs

pz1pi   1  δ RLq
rpβ   φbpzqqpz1pi   1  δq RLφbpzqs
qψpz1|zqdz1
Since
B
z1pi 1δRL
rpβ φbpzqqpz
1pi 1δqRLφbpzqs
Bz1
 βRLpi
rpβ φbpzqqpz1pi 1δqRLφbpzqs2
¡ 0, Hence, the right
hand side is positive because ψpz1|z   εq F.O.S.D. ψpz1|zq.
Also since
³8
0
ψpz1qrz1pi 1δRLs
rpβ φbqpz1pi 1δqRLφbs
dz1  0 by equation pA.11q and since
z1pi 1δRL
rpβ φbpzqqpz1pi 1δqRLφbpzqs
is increasing in z1, by lemma 22, the integral on the left hand
side is positive. Therefore, φ˜bpzq ¡ 0.
Therefore, the optimal proportional long-term debt decision, φb, is increasing in z
and decreasing in RL,
By equation pA.11q above, I obtain that when for the lowest level of productivity
zL, Epz
1|zLqpi  1 δ ¡ RL, then the constraint 0 ¤ a
1  b is always slack for all z, so
the above solution holds.
Also, I know that for a given RL, φb monotonically decreases over z. Hence, for
z ¡ z, φb is defined by
³8
0
RLψpz
1|zq
pβ φbqpz1pi 1δqRLφb
dz1  1
β
, and for z   z, φb  β, where
z satisfies RL  Epz
1|zqpi   1 δ.
Proof for Proposition 19
Suppose the productivity process is: logpz1q  ρ logpzqσ
2
2
 σε, where ε  Np0, 1q.
Then z1  zρeσε
σ2
2 and the FOCs in terms of z and ε are:
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Bφb
Bρ


³8
8
zρeσε
σ2
2 RL logpzqpifpεq
rpβ φbqpzρe
σεσ
2
2 pi 1δqRφbs2
dε
³8
8
RLrzρe
σεσ
2
2 pi 1δRLsfpεq
rpβ φbqpzρe
σεσ
2
2 pi 1δqRφbs2
dε
.
Since
³8
8
rzρeσε
σ2
2 pi 1δRLsfpεq
rpβ φbqpzρe
σεσ
2
2 pi 1δqRLφbs
dε  0 by equation pA.11q and since
RL
rpβ φbpzqqpz1pi 1δqRLφbpzqs
is decreasing in z1, by lemma 22, the denominator is always
negative. The numerator is positive if logpzq   1 and negative if logpzq ¡ 1. Therefore,
Bφb
Bρ
  0, if logpzq   1, and Bφb
Bρ
¡ 0, if logpzq ¡ 1.
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